Legal institutionalism: Capitalism and the constitutive role of law
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates for inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies.
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Cites
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“Property is a relationship between persons involving rights and duties, with regard to things (Commons 1924, Hallowell 1943).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAn Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
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“The ‘new property rights theory’ of Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart and John Moore (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1989, 1995, Hart and Moore 1990, Moore 1992) built on several preceding theories but were critical of their limitations.”
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Cited by
Assetization: Turning Things into Assets in Technoscientific Capitalism
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Precarious Territory: Property Law, Housing, and the Socio‐Spatial Order
Blomley, N. (2020) · Antipode · doi:10.1111/anti.12578 · Cited by 95
Metadata
- Authors
- Deakin, S., Gindis, D., Hodgson, G. M., Huang, K., & Pistor, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-02
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 188-200
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125736268
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 32.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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