The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, N. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 · Cited by 711
Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0023489 · Cited by 720
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06723 · Cited by 718
THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
SEFTON, M., SHUPP, R., & WALKER, J. M. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x · Cited by 649
Metadata
- Authors
- Bochet, O., Page, T., & Putterman, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 11-26
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2036951652
- Cited by
- 634
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 82.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.