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The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources
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Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 18,859
Self-citationUnderstanding Institutional Diversity
Ostrom, E. (2006) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400831739 · Cited by 5,140
Self-citationCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Understanding Institutional Diversity
Ostrom, E. (2009) · doi:10.2307/j.ctt7s7wm · Cited by 4,229
Self-citationThe Struggle to Govern the Commons
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1091015 · Cited by 4,209
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery
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Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.9739 · Cited by 3,732
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Self-citationHardin, R. (1982) · doi:10.56021/9780801828188 · Cited by 1,230
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992
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(2002) · National Academies Press eBooks · doi:10.17226/10287 · Cited by 1,125
Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems
Elinor Ostrom, B. (1992) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,069
The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership
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Self-citationHeterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management
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Self-citationLocal Enforcement and Better Forests
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Self-citationPeople and forests : communities, institutions, and governance
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Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
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Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry
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Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab
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Modeling individual behavior in common pool resource management experiments with autonomous agents
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Cited by
Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences
Falk, A., & Heckman, J. J. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1168244 · Cited by 1,033
On Behavioral-Environmental Economics
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Consumers’ categorization of eco-friendly consumer goods: An integrative review and research agenda
Larranaga, A., & Valor, C. (2022) · Sustainable Production and Consumption · doi:10.1016/j.spc.2022.10.005 · Cited by 49
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 149-163
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2052548288
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 21.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.