The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Grinstein, Y., & Hribar, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-07
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 119-143
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123056013
- Cited by
- 650
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 58.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.