The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are perks purely managerial excess?
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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The theory of the leisure class; an economic study of institutions
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Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
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Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns
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Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution
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Self-citationThe Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
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Self-citationBurrough, B., Helyar, J., Faram, C., Kehl, J., & Evans, D. E. (2000) · Pearson Education eBooks · Cited by 61
Executive compensation: Money, motivation, and imagination
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Cited by
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · Cited by 1,764
Corporate governance and firm performance
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.006 · Cited by 1,724
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007) · The Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/078559806 · Cited by 843
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1593 · Cited by 676
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005
Frydman, C., & Saks, R. E. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp120 · Cited by 604
Metadata
- Authors
- Rajan, R. G., & Wulf, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-33
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2074485686
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 50.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.