The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns
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Cites
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Self-citation
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Cited by
Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices
Edmans, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.021 · Cited by 2,511
The impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of bank loans
Goss, A., & Roberts, G. S. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.12.002 · Cited by 2,101
Corporate governance and firm performance
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.006 · Cited by 1,724
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Yermack, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 211-242
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122105346
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 58.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.