The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth
Open accessOverview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(96)00896-3 · Cited by 5,669
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G., & SWEENEY, A. P. (1996) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x · Cited by 4,065
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEOPreprint
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1995) · American Economic Review · Cited by 3,014
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x · Cited by 1,660
Self-citation
Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000004221 · Cited by 1,301
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu011 · Cited by 999
Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk?
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.003 · Cited by 804
The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation
Karpoff, J. M., Scott Lee, D., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.06.003 · Cited by 761
Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. (2013) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206312463938 · Cited by 616
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004 · Cited by 561
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters?
Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H., & Nekhili, M. (2018) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.12.010 · Cited by 553
The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2014) · Accounting and Regulation · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-8097-6_14 · Cited by 533
Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?
Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.011 · Cited by 510
Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management
Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J. M., & Nahata, R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011 · Cited by 502
Option Backdating and Board Interlocks
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Whitby, R. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn120 · Cited by 488
Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion
Chiu, P.-C., Teoh, S. H., & Tian, F. (2013) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50369 · Cited by 483
Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.009 · Cited by 470
CAI, J., GARNER, J. L., & WALKLING, R. A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x · Cited by 470
Amiram, D., Bozanic, Z., Cox, J. D., Dupont, Q., Karpoff, J. M., & Sloan, R. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9435-x · Cited by 422
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct
Egan, M., Matvos, G., & Seru, A. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/700735 · Cited by 410
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?☆
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.003 · Cited by 402
The Geography of Financial Misconduct
PARSONS, C. A., SULAEMAN, J., & TITMAN, S. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12704 · Cited by 379
Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists “just vote no”?☆
DELGUERCIO, D., SEERY, L., & WOIDTKE, T. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.01.002 · Cited by 376
Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.005 · Cited by 373
Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
MASULIS, R. W., & MOBBS, S. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x · Cited by 361
Big Five Audits and Accounting Fraud*
LENNOX, C., & PITTMAN, J. A. (2010) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01007.x · Cited by 359
Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Stubben, S. R. (2010) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.07.005 · Cited by 351
Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring
Wang, C., Xie, F., & Zhu, M. (2015) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109015000459 · Cited by 351
Does Company Reputation Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Restatements*
CAO, Y., MYERS, L. A., & OMER, T. C. (2012) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01137.x · Cited by 347
Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality?
He, X., Pittman, J. A., Rui, O. M., & Wu, D. (2017) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51696 · Cited by 341
THE ROLE OF THE INTERLOCKING DIRECTOR AND BOARD RECEPTIVITY IN THE DIFFUSION OF PRACTICES.
SHROPSHIRE, C. (2010) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2010.48463333 · Cited by 337
Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research
Karpoff, J. M., & Koester, A. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2811778 · Cited by 329
Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting
Jiang, W., Wan, H., & Zhao, S. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv125 · Cited by 324
Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud
LENNOX, C., LISOWSKY, P., & PITTMAN, J. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/joar.12002 · Cited by 320
Chief sustainability officers and corporate social (Ir)responsibility
Fu, R., Tang, Y., & Chen, G. (2020) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3113 · Cited by 314
Johnstone, K., Li, C., & Rupley, K. H. (2011) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01037.x · Cited by 292
Local investors and corporate governance
Chhaochharia, V., Kumar, A., & Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.03.002 · Cited by 268
Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
Brochet, F., & Srinivasan, S. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.013 · Cited by 265
A Multidisciplinary Review of the Director Selection Literature
Withers, M. C., Hillman, A. J., & Cannella, A. A. (2012) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311428671 · Cited by 263
A Synthesis of Fraud-Related Research
Trompeter, G. M., Carpenter, T. D., Desai, N., Jones, K. L., & Riley, R. A. (2013) · AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-50360 · Cited by 261
An empirical analysis of changes in credit rating properties: Timeliness, accuracy and volatility
Cheng, M., & Neamtiu, M. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.001 · Cited by 256
Punishment by Securities Regulators, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Cost of Debt
Gong, G., Huang, X., Wu, S., Tian, H., & Li, W. (2021) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04438-z · Cited by 253
Shareholder democracy in play: Career consequences of proxy contests
Fos, V., & Tsoutsoura, M. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.07.009 · Cited by 159
The career effects of scandal: Evidence from scientific retractions
Azoulay, P., Bonatti, A., & Krieger, J. L. (2017) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2017.07.003 · Cited by 118
Metadata
- Authors
- Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 306-336
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122071924
- Cited by
- 1,039
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 99.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.