The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth
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The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
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The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
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The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000004221 · Cited by 1,301
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu011 · Cited by 999
Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk?
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.003 · Cited by 804
Metadata
- Authors
- Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 306-336
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122071924
- Cited by
- 1,039
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 99.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.