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Creditor control rights and firm investment policy☆
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nini, G., Smith, D. C., & Sufi, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 400-420
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122493112
- Cited by
- 773
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 168.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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