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Metadata
- Authors
- Hwang, B.-H., & Kim, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-07
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 138-158
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096242048
- Cited by
- 917
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 155.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.