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The market reaction to corporate governance regulation
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Cited by
Linguistic Complexity in Firm Disclosures: Obfuscation or Information?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431-448
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1964572347
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 91.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.