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Metadata
- Authors
- Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-07
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 63-82
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123858746
- Cited by
- 561
- References
- 65
- FWCI
- 122.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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