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The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors
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Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects*
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Self-citationPolitical connections and SEC enforcement
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tahoun, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 86-110
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121680776
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 45.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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