The DOI matches its Crossref record; 104 of the 104 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
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The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
“Similarly, the manager might forego positive-NPV projects they consider too risky for their personal welfare (Gormley and Matsa, 2016). The moral hazard scenarios discussed above illustrate how managers' specific incentives may lead them to invest in a manner that does not align with shareholders' preferences. By incr…”
BackgroundMethodDoes a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity
Flammer, C., & Bansal, P. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2629 · Cited by 670
ESG shareholder engagement and downside risk
Hoepner, A. G. F., Oikonomou, I., Sautner, Z., Starks, L. T., & Zhou, X. Y. (2024) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfad034 · Cited by 425
Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers
Cain, M. D., McKeon, S. B., & Solomon, S. D. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003 · Cited by 392
Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws
KARPOFF, J. M., & WITTRY, M. D. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12600 · Cited by 272
Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions
Ghaly, M., Dang, V. A., & Stathopoulos, K. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101634 · Cited by 253
The product market effects of hedge fund activism
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.016 · Cited by 138
“The inclusion of these xed e¤ects ensures that our di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates are robust to industry- and time-speci c unobservable (or omitted) variables that might otherwise confound our analysis (Gormley and Matsa, 2014a).”
How Does Corporate Governance Affect Equity Volatility? Worldwide Evidence and Theory
Gagnon, L., & Jeanneret, A. (2025) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfad002 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 431-455
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125822881
- Cited by
- 507
- References
- 104
- FWCI
- 110.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.