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Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts
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“Similarly, the manager might forego positive-NPV projects they consider too risky for their personal welfare (Gormley and Matsa, 2016). The moral hazard scenarios discussed above illustrate how managers' specific incentives may lead them to invest in a manner that does not align with shareholders' preferences. By incr…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 431-455
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125822881
- Cited by
- 507
- References
- 104
- FWCI
- 110.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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