The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Politics and economics in weak and strong states
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationEndogenous Political Institutions
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Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States
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Cited by
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 · Cited by 1,637
State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
(2010) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta8073 · Cited by 850
Property Rights and Economic Development*
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9 · Cited by 646
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa *
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt029 · Cited by 581
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Monetary Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1199-1226
- ISSN
- 0304-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123649436
- Cited by
- 489
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 16.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.