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Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities
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Metadata
- Authors
- Clarke, G. R. G., & Xu, L. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-08
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 2067-2097
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2149074062
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 59
- FWCI
- 19.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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