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Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-08
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 7-8
- Pages
- 843-851
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1985875710
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 39.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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