Conditional reciprocity in the investment game
Abstract
This paper investigates whether people are conditional reciprocators in an investment game experiment, in the sense that the more they are trusted, the more they reciprocate. The results show that the majority of participants are conditional reciprocators but that they can be classified into three types: (1) exploitative reciprocators who do not reciprocate and exploit trust; (2) egoistic reciprocators who neither exploit nor reward trust; and (3) generous reciprocators who reward trusting behavior.
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It is very common for investors to choose conditional investment behavior in their daily economic activities when interacting with other agents.
“Furthermore, it is very common for investors to choose conditional investment behavior in their daily economic activities when interacting with other agents [2, 5].”
From Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions (2022) · cites this paper as [2]
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Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions
Liu, L., & Chen, X. (2022) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2022.07.073 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ahmed, A.
- Affiliations
- Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Ahmed, Ali
- ORCID
- Ahmed, Ali
- Venue
- The Social Science Journal
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2011-06-01
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 404-408
- ISSN
- 0362-3319 (ISSN-L)
- 1873-5355
- OpenAlex
- W1489564898
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 0.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Social Science Journal (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- trust game, trust
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