The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Falls from Height in the Construction Industry: A Critical Review of the Scientific Literature
Nadhim, E., Hon, C., Xia, B., Stewart, I., & Fang, D. (2016) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph13070638 · Cited by 262
Koenitz, H., Barbara, J., & Eladhari, M. P. (2022) · New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia · doi:10.1080/13614568.2023.2181503 · Cited by 28
“Concrete applications of complexity sciences include weather forecasts (Mihailovi ć et al., 2014), the analysis of ecological systems (Biggs et al., 2021) and accident investigations (Dekker et al., 2011).”
BackgroundThe Paradigm of Game System Building
Koenitz, H., & Eladhari, M. P. (2021) · Transactions of the Digital Games Research Association · doi:10.26503/todigra.v5i3.123 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Dekker, S., Cilliers, P., & Hofmeyr, J.-H.
- Venue
- Safety Science
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-07
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 939-945
- ISSN
- 0925-7535 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2086423650
- Cited by
- 398
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 32.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.