The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems
Open accessAbstract
Three experiments examined people's ability to incorporate base rate information when judging posterior probabilities. Specifically, we tested the (Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgement under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73) conclusion that people's reasoning appears to follow Bayesian principles when they are presented with information in a frequency format, but not when information is presented as one case probabilities. First, we found that frequency formats were not generally associated with better performance than probability formats unless they were presented in a manner which facilitated construction of a set inclusion mental model. Second, we demonstrated that the use of frequency information may promote biases in the weighting of information. When participants are asked to express their judgements in frequency rather than probability format, they were more likely to produce the base rate as their answer, ignoring diagnostic evidence.
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Cites
Cosmides, L. (1996) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8 · Cited by 1,293
Research works printed but not linked: 8
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Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012 · Cited by 1,569
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T., Handley, S. J., Perham, N., Over, D. E., & Thompson, V. A.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-12
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 197-213
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2106984223
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 12.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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