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Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
Abstract
The complexity of human's cooperative behavior cannot be fully explained by theories of kin selection and group selection. If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic behavior, it would have to depart from direct reciprocity, which requires dyads of individuals to interact repeatedly. For indirect reciprocity to rationalize cooperation among genetically unrelated or even culturally dissimilar individuals, information about the reputation of individuals must be assessed and propagated in a population. Here, we propose a new framework for the evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: information selectively retrieved from and propagated through dynamically evolving networks of friends and acquaintances. We show that for indirect reciprocity to be evolutionarily stable, the differential probability of trusting and helping a reputable individual over a disreputable individual, at a point in time, must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. In other words, the benefit received by the trustworthy must out-weigh the cost of helping the untrustworthy.
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A stable mix of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists which cannot be invaded by defectors is also obtained by assuming that as players grow older, their social network grows, and with it their information about their co-players' past.
“A stable mix of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists which cannot be invaded by defectors, is also obtained by assuming that as players grow older, their social network grows, and with it their information about their co-players' past 54,55 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [55]
If players meet randomly or the social network is fluid, upstream reciprocity is too diffuse to prevent defectors from taking over.
“If the players meet randomly, however, or the social network is fluid, then upstream reciprocity is too diffuse to prevent defectors from taking over 2,55 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [55]
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References 20 · Cited by 115
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mohtashemi, M., & Mui, L.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Mohtashemi, Mojdeh
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 223
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 523-531
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032326890
- Cited by
- 115
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 23.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, social information, trust, reputation, altruism, evolution of cooperation, evolutionarily stable strategy, benefit-cost ratio, acquaintance networks, kin selection, group selection
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Computer Simulation, Biological Evolution, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Memory, Models, Psychological, Social Desirability, Trust
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