The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Truth and Truthmakers
Abstract
Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.
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Cites
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Self-citation(1986)
Cited by
Cameron, R. P. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9223-3 · Cited by 349
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
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Grounding is not a Strict Order
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Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding
Audi, P. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12605 · Cited by 47
Tugby, M. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1036-x · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, D. M.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2004-05-27
- OpenAlex
- W620387456
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 35.53
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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