The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships
Abstract
Why do some dictatorships establish institutions that may constrain their leaders? We argue that institutions promote the survival of dictatorships by facilitating authoritarian power-sharing. Specifically, institutions such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils alleviate commitment and monitoring problems between the dictator and his allies caused by the secrecy in authoritarian governance. However, because authoritarian power-sharing succeeds only when it is backed by a credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator’s allies, institutions will be ineffective or break down when an imbalance of power within the ruling coalition undermines this threat’s credibility. Our arguments clarify the complex interaction between collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems in authoritarian governance. We use both historical and large-N data to assess new empirical predictions about the relationship between political institutions, leader survival, and the concentration of power in dictatorships.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 2×
“While our model of an authoritarian polity shares some features with Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory (see also Besley and Kudamatsu 2007; Haber 2007; Pepinsky 2009), we differ from most existing research in our explicit focus on the collective action problem that the dictator’s allies face when st…”
ResultAlesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
Self-citationWhat Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, J. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802348 · Cited by 1,070
KALYVAS, S. N., & BALCELLS, L. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000286 · Cited by 858
Cited by
Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12207 · Cited by 636
Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.1.2.88 · Cited by 576
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2019) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.33.4.100 · Cited by 560
The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism
Pepinsky, T. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021 · Cited by 511
Metadata
- Authors
- Boix, C., & Svolik, M. W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2013-04
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 300-316
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W3122016866
- Cited by
- 971
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 143.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Boix, C., & Svolik, M. W. (2013). The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000029
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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