Reflective liberals and intuitive conservatives: A look at the Cognitive Reflection Test and ideology
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives—more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.
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Citations
Cites
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904 · cited 5×
“For example, conservatives are more reliant on heuristics associated with implicit reasoning (e.g., Bizer et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2003; Rokeach 1948; Sargent 2004; Sidanius 1985; Tetlock 1983; Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Van Hiel, et al. 2004; Wilson et al. 1973), indicating less use of reflection…”
InfluentialEvaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk
Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpr057 · Cited by 4,008
Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection
Kahan, D. M. (2013) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500005271 · Cited by 1,302 · cited 2×
“Kahan (2013) was focused more centrally on this correlation between reflection and ideology, and found no significant relationship at all.”
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 · Cited by 1,047
Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning.
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569 · Cited by 844
Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006 · Cited by 726 · cited 1×
“Additionally, we experimentally investigate whether political attitudes can be manipulated by priming intuition or reflection—something that no published study we are aware of has yet attempted (but see Swami et al., 2014, on manipulating conspiracist ideation).”
Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0025391 · Cited by 557
Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003 · Cited by 544
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Cited by
Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology
Jost, J. T. (2017) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12407 · Cited by 696
van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F., & Jost, J. T. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12681 · Cited by 291
False Equivalence: Are Liberals and Conservatives in the United States Equally Biased?
Baron, J., & Jost, J. T. (2019) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691618788876 · Cited by 213
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
False polarization: Cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions
Fernbach, P. M., & Van Boven, L. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.06.005 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- Deppe, K. D., Gonzalez, F. J., Neiman, J. L., Jacobs, C., Pahlke, J., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 314-331
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2288595912
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 8.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Deppe, K. D., Gonzalez, F. J., Neiman, J. L., Jacobs, C., Pahlke, J., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R. (2015). Reflective liberals and intuitive conservatives: A look at the Cognitive Reflection Test and ideology. Judgment and Decision Making. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500005131
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