On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six clarifications
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Previous studies of loss aversion in decisions under risk have led to mixed results. Losses appear to loom larger than gains in some settings, but not in others. The current paper clarifies these results by highlighting six experimental manipulations that tend to increase the likelihood of the behavior predicted by loss aversion. These manipulations include: (1) framing of the safe alternative as the status quo; (2) ensuring that the choice pattern predicted by loss aversion maximizes the probability of positive (rather than zero or negative) outcomes; (3) the use of high nominal (numerical) payoffs; (4) the use of high stakes; (5) the inclusion of highly attractive risky prospects that creates a contrast effect; and (6) the use of long experiments in which no feedback is provided and in which the computation of the expected values is difficult. In addition, the results suggest the possibility of learning in the absence of feedback: The tendency to select simple strategies, like “maximize the worst outcome” which implies “loss aversion”, increases when this behavior is not costly. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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Citations
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Cited by
Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices
Gächter, S., Johnson, E. J., & Herrmann, A. (2022) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-021-09839-8 · Cited by 504
A meta-analysis on age differences in risky decision making: Adolescents versus children and adults.
Defoe, I. N., Dubas, J. S., Figner, B., & van Aken, M. A. G. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038088 · Cited by 456
The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?
Gal, D., & Rucker, D. D. (2018) · Journal of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1002/jcpy.1047 · Cited by 307
Losses as modulators of attention: Review and analysis of the unique effects of losses over gains.
Yechiam, E., & Hochman, G. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0029383 · Cited by 284
Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
Erev, I., & Roth, A. E. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1402846111 · Cited by 155
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ert, E., & Erev, I.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 214-235
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4313429369
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 9.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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