Eliminating the hindsight bias.
Abstract
Those who consider the likelihood of an event after it has occurred exaggerate their likelihood of having been able to predict that event in advance. We attempted to eliminate this hindsight bias among 194 neuropsychologists. Foresight subjects read a case history and were asked to estimate the probability of three different diagnoses. Subjects in each of the three hindsight groups were told that one of the three diagnoses was correct and were asked to state what probability they would have assigned to each diagnosis if they were making the original diagnosis. Foresight-reasons and hindsight-reasons subjects performed the same task as their foresight and hindsight counterparts, except they had to list one reason why each of the possible diagnoses might be correct. The frequency of subjects succumbing to the hindsight bias was lower in the hindsight-reasons groups than in the hindsight groups not asked to list reasons, x!( 1, N = 140) = 4.12, p < .05.
Cites (15)
- Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and BiasesTversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and MemoryLyle E. Bourne · 1977
- Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty.Baruch Fischhoff · 1975 · Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance
- Reasons for confidence.Koriat, Asher, Lichtenstein, Sarah, Fischhoff, Baruch · 1980 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory
- Hindsight-foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty.: (459202004-001)Fischhoff, Baruch · 1974 · PsycEXTRA Dataset
- Considering the opposite: A corrective strategy for social judgment.Lord, Charles G., Lepper, Mark R., Preston, Elizabeth · 1984 · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- I knew it would happenFischhoff, Baruch, Beyth, Ruth · 1975 · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance
- Perceived informativeness of facts.Fischhoff, Baruch · 1977 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
- Hindsight bias among physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses.Arkes, Hal R., Wortmann, Robert L., Saville, Paul D., Harkness, Allan R. · 1981 · Journal of Applied Psychology
- The knew-it-all-along effect.Gordon S Wood · 1978 · Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance
Cited by (42)
- Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many GuisesNickerson, Raymond S. · 1998 · Review of General Psychology
- Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive JudgmentBottom, William P., Gilovich, Thomas, Griffin, Dale, Kahneman, Daniel · 2004 · The Academy of Management Review
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- The Affect HeuristicSlovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- “Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”Dawes, Robyn M., Faust, David, Meehl, Paul E. · 1989 · Science
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Eliminating the hindsight bias. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0021-9010.73.2.305
- The paper
- Arkes, H. R., Faust, D., Guilmette, T. J., & Hart, K. (1988). Eliminating the hindsight bias. Journal of Applied Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-9010.73.2.305
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.