Flexible correction processes in social judgment: The role of naive theories in corrections for perceived bias.

Abstract

Unlike many models of bias correction, our flexible correction model posits that corrections occur when judges are motivated and able to adjust assessments of targets according to their naive theories of how the context affects judgments of the target(s). In the current research, people flexibly correct assessments of different targets within the same context according to the differing theories associated with the context-target pairs. In Study 1, shared theories of assimilation and contrast bias are identified. Corrections consistent with those theories are obtained in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 shows that idiographic measures of theories of bias predict the direction and magnitude of corrections. Implications of this work for corrections of attributions and bias removal in general are discussed.

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5. Untitled work
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