Heuristics and biases: Expertise and task realism in auditing.

Abstract

Important issues concerning generalizations drawn from heuristics research that depict humans as highly prone to a number of judgmental biases have been raised in recent years. Some researches have argued that the tasks and subjects examined do not adequately represent the contexts to which generalizations are made, citing evidence of improved performance for expert judges working realistic, familar tasks. This article presents additional evidence on these issues by reviewing experimental research on certain heuristics and biases in professional auditor judgments.

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Cited by (8)

1. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
   Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
2. The Affect Heuristic
   Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
3. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
   Tversky, Amos, Koehler, Derek J. · 1994 · Psychological Review
4. Varieties of Confirmation Bias
   Klayman, Joshua · 1995 · Psychology of Learning and Motivation
5. Why study expert decision making? Some historical perspectives and comments
   Shanteau, James, Stewart, Thomas R · 1992 · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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