On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.
Abstract
the heuristics-and-biases approach to statistical reasoning is and is not about. At issue is the imposition of unnecessarily narrow norms of sound reasoning that are used to diagnose so-called cognitive illusions and the continuing reliance on vague heuristics that explain everything and nothing. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1996) incorrectly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. In contrast, Gigerenzer has proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgments are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not. or how often, cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be rather the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear. A postscript responds to Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) postscript. I welcome Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) reply to my critique (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991, 1994; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) and hope this exchange will encourage a rethinking of research strategies. I emphasize research strategies, rather than specific empirical results or even explanations of those results, because I believe that this debate is fundamentally about what
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Cited by (60)
- Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gigerenzer, Gerd, Goldstein, Daniel G. · 1996 · Psychological Review
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing2001 · The Journal of Finance
- The Affect HeuristicSlovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the WorkplaceDunning, David, Heath, Chip, Suls, Jerry M. · 2004 · Psychological Science in the Public Interest
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-295x.103.3.592
- The paper
- Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.103.3.592
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