Are judgments of the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to availability?

Sedlmeier, Peter, Hertwig, Ralph, Gigerenzer, Gerd·1998·Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition

Abstract

How do people estimate whether a particular letter is more frequent in the 1st versus in a later position? The authors tested 2 precise versions of the availability hypothesis, a hypothesis that assumes that frequency processing occurs on the level of the phonological classes of vowels and consonants, and the regressed-frequencies hypothesis, which assumes monitoring of individual letters. Across 3 studies, it was found that (a) judgments of whether a letter is more frequent in the 1st or the 2rid position generally followed the actual proportions and (b) the estimated relative frequencies in the 1st versus the 2rid position closely agreed with the actual rank ordering, except for an overestimation of low and underestimation of high values. These results favor the regressed-frequencies hypothesis and challenge the conclusions about frequency judgments in the heuristics and biases literature.

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Cited by (13)

  1. Heuristic decision making
    Gigerenzer, Gerd, Gaissmaier, Wolfgang · 2011 · Annual Review of Psychology
  2. Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
    Gigerenzer, Gerd, Brighton, Henry · 2009 · Topics in Cognitive Science
  3. Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.
    Fiedler, Klaus · 2000 · Psychological Review
  4. Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Tools of Bounded Rationality
    Gigerenzer, Gerd · 2004 · Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
  5. Rationality for mortals: how people cope with uncertainty
    2009 · Choice Reviews Online

See all 148

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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Are judgments of the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to availability? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0278-7393.24.3.754
The paper
Sedlmeier, P., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Are judgments of the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to availability? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.24.3.754

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