A reexamination of the perceptual-to-conceptual shift in mental representations.
Abstract
The authors discuss the origins of categorical representations in young infants, using recent evidence on the categorization of animals. This evidence suggests that mature conceptual representations for animals derive from the earliest perceptually based representations of animals formed by young infants, those based on the surface features characteristic of each species, including humans. The shift from perceptually to conceptually based representation is a gradual and continuous process marked by initial, relatively simple, perceptually based representations coming to include more and more specific values of common animal properties. Development is thus a process of enrichment by perceptual systems, including that for language, and without the need of specialized processes that alter the nature of human thought and the representation of human knowledge.
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Cited by (8)
- The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday ThoughtGelman, Susan A. · 2003
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscienceBlock, Ned · 2007 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Representation of the Gender of Human Faces by Infants: A Preference for FemaleQuinn, Paul C, Yahr, Joshua, Kuhn, Abbie, Slater, Alan M, Pascalis, Olivier · 2002 · Perception
- Developmental origin of the animate–inanimate distinction.Rakison, David H., Poulin-Dubois, Diane · 2001 · Psychological Bulletin
- Learning from Others: Children's Construction of ConceptsGelman, Susan A. · 2009 · Annual Review of Psychology
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A reexamination of the perceptual-to-conceptual shift in mental representations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//1089-2680.1.3.271
- The paper
- Quinn, P. C., & Eimas, P. D. (1997). A reexamination of the perceptual-to-conceptual shift in mental representations. Review of General Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037//1089-2680.1.3.271
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.