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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger?

Mullen, Elizabeth, Skitka, Linda J.·2006·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, their judgments of both outcome and procedural fairness become driven more by whether outcomes support or oppose their moral mandates than by whether procedures are proper or improper (the moral mandate effect). Two studies tested 3 explanations for the moral mandate effect. In particular, people with moral mandates may (a) have a greater motivation to seek out procedural flaws when outcomes fail to support their moral point of view (the motivated reasoning hypothesis), (b) be influenced by in-group distributive biases as a result of identifying with parties that share rather than oppose their moral point of view (the group differentiation hypothesis), or (c) react with anger when outcomes are inconsistent with their moral point of view, which, in turn, colors perceptions of both outcomes and procedures (the anger hypothesis). Results support the anger hypothesis.

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Metadata

Authors
Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J.
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
2006
Volume
90
Issue
4
Pages
629-643
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2103462169
Cited by
245
References
13
FWCI
4.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.629
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Mullen, E., & Skitka, L. J. (2006). Exploring the psychological underpinnings of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, group differentiation, or anger? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.629

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.