The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Weighing risk and uncertainty.
Abstract
Decision theory distinguishes between risky prospects, where the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes are assumed to be known, and uncertain prospects, where these probabilities are not assumed to be known. Studies of choice between risky prospects have suggested a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale that overweights low probabilities and underweights moderate and high probabilities. The present article extends this notion from risk to uncertainty by invoking the principle of bounded subadditivity: An event has greater impact when it turns impossibility into possibility, or possibility into certainty, than when it merely makes a possibility more or less likely. A series of studies provides support for this principle in decision under both risk and uncertainty and shows that people are less sensitive to uncertainty than to risk. Finally, the article discusses the relationship between probability judgments and decision weights and distinguishes relative sensitivity from ambiguity aversion.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationAdvances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Self-citationKnight, F. H. (1921) · Cited by 9,948
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.011 · Cited by 3,712
Self-citationThe Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. J. (1948) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256692 · Cited by 3,077
Keynes, J. M. (1973) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00843-8 · Cited by 2,575
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795
Markowitz, H. (1952) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257177 · Cited by 1,771
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Shaping perceptions to motivate healthy behavior: The role of message framing.
Rothman, A. J., & Salovey, P. (1997) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.3 · Cited by 1,932
Bringing the Frame Into Focus: The Influence of Regulatory Fit on Processing Fluency and Persuasion.
Lee, A. Y., & Aaker, J. L. (2004) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.205 · Cited by 1,536
The impact of sleep deprivation on decision making: A review.
Harrison, Y., & Horne, J. A. (2000) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied · doi:10.1037/1076-898x.6.3.236 · Cited by 1,238
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Fox, C. R.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269-283
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2155513791
- Cited by
- 913
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 8.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
