Weighing risk and uncertainty.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Decision theory distinguishes between risky prospects, where the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes are assumed to be known, and uncertain prospects, where these probabilities are not assumed to be known. Studies of choice between risky prospects have suggested a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale that overweights low probabilities and underweights moderate and high probabilities. The present article extends this notion from risk to uncertainty by invoking the principle of bounded subadditivity: An event has greater impact when it turns impossibility into possibility, or possibility into certainty, than when it merely makes a possibility more or less likely. A series of studies provides support for this principle in decision under both risk and uncertainty and shows that people are less sensitive to uncertainty than to risk. Finally, the article discusses the relationship between probability judgments and decision weights and distinguishes relative sensitivity from ambiguity aversion.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationKnight, F. H. (1921) · Cited by 16,656
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467 · cited 5×
“Such prospects were investigated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , using the same experimental procedure and a similar subject population.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citation“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.011 · Cited by 3,712
Self-citationThe Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. J. (1948) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256692 · Cited by 3,077
Keynes, J. M. (1973) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00843-8 · Cited by 2,575
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795 · cited 1×
“For further discussions of ambiguity aversion and source preference, see Camerer and Weber (1992) , Fox and Tversky (in press), and Frisch and Baron (1988).”
BackgroundMarkowitz, H. (1952) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257177 · Cited by 1,771
Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057884 · Cited by 1,654 · cited 1×
“Heath and Tversky (1991) showed that people who were knowledgeable about sports but not about politics preferred to bet on sports events rather than on chance events that these people had judged equally probable.”
BackgroundSelf-citationSupport theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Self-citationCurvature of the Probability Weighting Function
Wu, G., & Gonzalez, R. (1996) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.42.12.1676 · Cited by 987
Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in probability
Camerer, C. F., & Ho, T.-H. (1994) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf01065371 · Cited by 739
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
Fox, C. R., & Tversky, A. (2000) · Choices, Values, and Frames · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475.031 · Cited by 670
Self-citationFraming, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions
Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H. (1993) · Making Decisions About Liability And Insurance · doi:10.1007/978-94-011-2192-7_3 · Cited by 668
Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights
Tversky, A., & Wakker, P. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171769 · Cited by 569
Self-citationKachelmeier, S. J., & Shehata, M. (1992) · American Economic Review · Cited by 464
Frisch, D., & Baron, J. (1988) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.3960010303 · Cited by 451
An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory
Wakker, P., & Tversky, A. (1993) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf01065812 · Cited by 447
Self-citationTWO‐PIECE VON NEUMANN‐MORGENSTERN UTILITY FUNCTIONS*
Fishburn, P. C., & Kochenberger, G. A. (1979) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1979.tb00043.x · Cited by 388
Prospective reference theory: Toward an explanation of the paradoxes
Viscusi, W. (1989) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00209389 · Cited by 367
Venture Theory: A Model of Decision Weights
Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.7.780 · Cited by 337
Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion
Wakker, P. P. (1994) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf01075296 · Cited by 337
Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions.
Edwards, W. (1962) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0038674 · Cited by 336
An Experimental Study of the Auction-Value of an Uncertain Outcome
Preston, M. G., & Baratta, P. (1948) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416964 · Cited by 326
The influence of probability on risky choice
Lattimore, P. K., Baker, J. R., & Witte, A. D. (1992) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(95)90015-2 · Cited by 289
Cohen, M., Jaffray, J.-Y., & Said, T. (1987) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(87)90043-4 · Cited by 262
Distortion of Subjective Probabilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty
Fellner, W. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884325 · Cited by 232
Prospect theory's reflection hypothesis: A critical examination
Hershey, J. C., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(80)90037-9 · Cited by 215
Note—Further Tests of Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior
Payne, J. W., Laughhunn, D. J., & Crum, R. (1981) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.27.8.953 · Cited by 179
Utility theory and additivity analysis of risky choices.
Tversky, A. (1967) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0024915 · Cited by 144
Self-citationFildes, R. A. (1988) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(88)90123-9 · Cited by 113
Similarity of rectangles: An analysis of subjective dimensions
Krantz, D. H., & Tversky, A. (1975) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(75)90047-4 · Cited by 112
Self-citationRisk taking over gains and losses: A study of oil executives
Wehrung, D. A. (1989) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/bf02283517 · Cited by 50
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The Probability Weighting Function
Prelec, D. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998573 · Cited by 1,983
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Fox, C. R.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269-283
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2155513791
- Cited by
- 913
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 8.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.