When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight.
Abstract
Two studies demonstrated that attempts to debias hindsight by thinking about alternative outcomes may backfire and traced this to the influence of subjective accessibility experiences. Participants listed either few (2) or many (10) thoughts about how an event might have turned out otherwise. Listing many counterfactual thoughts was experienced as difficult and consistently increased the hindsight bias, presumably because the experienced difficulty suggested that there were not many ways in which the event might have turned out otherwise. No significant hindsight effects were obtained when participants listed only a few counterfactual thoughts, a task subjectively experienced as easy. The interplay of accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences in the hindsight bias is discussed.
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It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements.
“It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004).”
From A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions. (2025) · cites this paper as Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002
Cites
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Consistent with the logic of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), this ease of generation presumably suggested that there were a few ways in which the British–Gurkha war could have turned out otherwise, thus attenuating the hindsight bias.”
Ease of retrieval as information: another look at the availability heuristic
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.2.195 · Cited by 1,412 · see citing works
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Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 · Cited by 2,920 · see citing works
Self-citationMood as information: 20 years later.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2003.9682896 · Cited by 907 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence
Wood, T., & Porter, E. (2019) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-018-9443-y · Cited by 904 · see citing works
Schwarz, N., Sanna, L. J., Skurnik, I., & Yoon, C. (2007) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(06)39003-x · Cited by 441 · see citing works
Self-citationMental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been
Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01974-5 · Cited by 282 · see citing works
Making the Truth Stick & the Myths Fade: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology
Schwarz, N., Newman, E., & Leach, W. (2016) · Behavioral Science & Policy · doi:10.1353/bsp.2016.0009 · Cited by 203 · see citing works
Self-citationWhen cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology
Samuelson, P. L., & Church, I. M. (2015) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.904197 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions.
Freeman, D., Isham, L., & Waite, F. (2025) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291725001242 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Whar-ton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004).”
Contextual Debiasing and Critical Thinking: Reasons for Optimism
Correia, V. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9388-x · Cited by 14 · see citing works
- Authors
- Sanna, L. J., Schwarz, N., & Stocker, S. L.
- Affiliations
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
- University of Michigan (US)
- ORCID
- Schwarz, Norbert
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 497-502
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W1997098600
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 12.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Keywords
- hindsight bias, bias mitigation, counterfactual reasoning, accessible content, perceived difficulty, alternative outcomes, cognitive effort
- MeSH terms
- Analysis of Variance, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Surveys and Questionnaires, Bias, Problem-Based Learning
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