Cited by 203Misinformation and Its ImpactsDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEducational Strategies and Epistemologies

Making the Truth Stick & the Myths Fade: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology

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Schwarz, Norbert, Newman, Eryn, Leach, William·2016·Behavioral Science & Policy

Abstract

Erroneous beliefs are difficult to correct. Worse, popular correction strategies, such as the myth-versus-fact article format, may backfire because they subtly reinforce the myths through repetition and further increase the spread and acceptance of misinformation. Here we identify five key criteria people employ as they evaluate the truth of a statement: They assess general acceptance by others, gauge the amount \nof supporting evidence, determine its compatibility with their beliefs, assess the general coherence of the statement, and judge the credibility of the source of the information. In assessing these five criteria, people can actively seek additional information (an effortful analytic strategy) or attend to the subjective experience of easy mental processing—what psychologists call fluent processing—and simply draw conclusions on the basis of what feels right (a less effortful intuitive strategy).

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Crossref · 10.1177/237946151600200110

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59 of 59 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The myths versus facts format often backfires because the simple repetition of the myth amplifies the familiarity of that false claim, making it seem even more believable and widely-shared.

    “This is the case of one of the most frequently used corrective strategy employing the myths versus facts format, which often backfires because the simple repetition of the myth, though well-intended and necessary in order to contrast it with the available evidence, paradoxically amplifies the familiarity of that false claim making it seem even more believable and widely-shared [46].”

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Authors
Schwarz, N., Newman, E., & Leach, W.
Affiliations
University of Southern California (US)
Corresponding author
Schwarz, Norbert
Venue
Behavioral Science & Policy
Published
2016-04
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
85-95
ISSN
  • 2379-4607 (ISSN-L)
  • 2379-4615
OpenAlex
W2541661561
Cited by
203
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 12
FWCI
43.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral Science & Policy (publishedVersion)
  • Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
  • ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
Keywords
misinformation, belief updating, source credibility, evidence evaluation, belief coherence, fluency, intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, misinformation spread

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