The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.
Open accessAbstract
The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.
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Cites
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Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
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The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity
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Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
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Adaptive strategy selection in decision making.
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Cited by
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0020762 · Cited by 752
Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633 · Cited by 745
Rationality for mortals: how people cope with uncertainty
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-4133 · Cited by 469
Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent are Policy and Theory?
Grüne-Yanoff, T., & Hertwig, R. (2016) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-015-9367-9 · Cited by 338
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 983-1002
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- OpenAlex
- W2103254008
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 4.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.