Probability theory, not the very guide of life.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Probability theory has long been taken as the self-evident norm against which to evaluate inductive reasoning, and classical demonstrations of violations of this norm include the conjunction error and base-rate neglect. Many of these phenomena require multiplicative probability integration, whereas people seem more inclined to linear additive integration, in part, at least, because of well-known capacity constraints on controlled thought. In this article, the authors show with computer simulations that when based on approximate knowledge of probabilities, as is routinely the case in natural environments, linear additive integration can yield as accurate estimates, and as good average decision returns, as estimates based on probability theory. It is proposed that in natural environments people have little opportunity or incentive to induce the normative rules of probability theory and, given their cognitive constraints, linear additive integration may often offer superior bounded rationality.
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Citations
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Self-citationExploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework
Nilsson, H. (2008) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.615 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“) Rather, a large number of studies suggest that the conjunction error is caused by participants combining probabilities in a way that deviates from the rules of probability theory (Abelson, Leddo, & Gross, 1987; Einhorn, 1985; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996, 1997, 1998; Gavanski & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Kariyazono, 1991; Nilss…”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
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Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342
“For example, Zhang and Maloney (2012) argued for the presence of “ubiquitous log odds” that systematically distort people’s probability judgments such that small values are overestimated and large values are underestimated (Brooke & MacRae 1977; Juslin et al. 2009; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Varey et al. 1990).”
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Kliegr, T., Bahník, Š., & Fürnkranz, J. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103458 · Cited by 139
Linda is not a bearded lady: configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors
Nilsson, H., Winman, A., Juslin, P., & Hansson, G. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0017351 · Cited by 64
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Juslin, P., Nilsson, H., & Winman, A.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 856-874
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2072806785
- Cited by
- 102
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 2.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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