Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 210 of the 210 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.
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“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [49]
In the citing paper
“Bowers and Davis (2012) warned that many Bayesian models are too flexible to be falsifiable and often rely on post hoc parameter fitting rather than making risky predictions.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“When closely examined, many “Bayesian brain” models function not as process models—particularly in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry—describing actual neural mechanisms, but as statistical descriptions that characterize behavioral or neural data in Bayesian terms, often retrospectively (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“By adjusting free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“This is especially true when priors and likelihoods are fitted retroactively, require strong post hoc assumptions to align with the data, or fail to establish any clear neural implementation of Bayesian principles (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bowers, Jeffrey S.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 389-414
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2147565549
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 208
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 28.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- just-so stories, Optimality Theory, unfalsifiability, utility functions, prediction accuracy, neuronal populations, rational analysis, cognitive science methodology
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Biological Evolution, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Motor Skills, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
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