Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
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Abstract
According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.
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“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [49]
In the citing paper
“Bowers and Davis (2012) warned that many Bayesian models are too flexible to be falsifiable and often rely on post hoc parameter fitting rather than making risky predictions.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“When closely examined, many “Bayesian brain” models function not as process models—particularly in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry—describing actual neural mechanisms, but as statistical descriptions that characterize behavioral or neural data in Bayesian terms, often retrospectively (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
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“By adjusting free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“This is especially true when priors and likelihoods are fitted retroactively, require strong post hoc assumptions to align with the data, or fail to establish any clear neural implementation of Bayesian principles (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
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“Griffiths TL, Chater N, Norris D, Pouget A. 2012 How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): comment on Bowers and Davis (2012).”
BackgroundThe role of sensory uncertainty in simple contour integration
Zhou, Y., Acerbi, L., & Ma, W. J. (2020) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006308 · Cited by 14
Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review
Piekarski, M. (2021) · Avant · doi:10.26913/avant.2021.01.04 · Cited by 18
Baraldi, A., Sapia, L. D., Tiede, D., Sudmanns, M., Augustin, H., & Lang, S. (2022) · Big Earth Data · doi:10.1080/20964471.2021.2017549 · Cited by 15
Statistical Learning Model of the Sense of Agency
Yano, S., Hayashi, Y., Murata, Y., Imamizu, H., Maeda, T., & Kondo, T. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539957 · Cited by 14
“, the superiority of the Bayesian inference is rarely verified with respect to other inference rules (Bowers and Davis, 2012; Colombo et al., 2018)Pearl (1988, Chapter 2) (Halpern, 2017, Chapter 3).”
ResultBridging the gap between Bayesian and story-comparison models of juridical inference
Spottswood, E. (2013) · Law Probability and Risk · doi:10.1093/lpr/mgt010 · Cited by 16
Jenny, M. A., Rieskamp, J., & Nilsson, H. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0034261 · Cited by 13
Egger, S. W., & Jazayeri, M. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-30722-0 · Cited by 13
On quantum computing for artificial superintelligence
Grabowska, A., & Gunia, A. (2024) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-024-00584-7 · Cited by 18
“Besides problems with computational complexity, researchers usually mention yet another general problem with the Bayesian approach to modeling general reasoning (for an overview, see Bowers & Davis, 2012; but see also Griffiths et al., 2012 for a reply).”
Normative accounts of illusory correlations.
Bott, F. M., Kellen, D., & Klauer, K. C. (2021) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000273 · Cited by 13
The Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy
Chamberlin, D. E. (2023) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.955558 · Cited by 13
“As with any normative theory, its ultimate utility depends on how well it explains empiric observations and generates testable predictions (Bowers and Davis, 2012).”
BackgroundCamponogara, I. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105228 · Cited by 15
“Studies, indeed, often assumed the validity of the MLE model without directly comparing its predictions with those from alternative non-Bayesian models (Bowers and Davis, 2012).”
WONDEREN, E. V., & Nieuwland, M. S. (2023) · Journal of Memory and Language · doi:10.1016/j.jml.2023.104435 · Cited by 16
Deep CANALs: a deep learning approach to refining the canalization theory of psychopathology
Juliani, A., Safron, A., & Kanai, R. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae005 · Cited by 15
“…had significant success explaining and predicting a diverse array of empirical phenomena (Walsh et al., 2020; Draganov et al., 2023), both at low and high levels of abstraction (Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Kanai et al., 2015) (although for a critique of the framework, see Bowers and Davis (2012)).”
Kämmer, J. E., Gaissmaier, W., & Czienskowski, U. (2013) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500005994 · Cited by 16
Eating with our eyes: on the color of flavor
Spence, C. J. (2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107337930.030 · Cited by 14
Davis, C. J., & Lupker, S. J. (2017) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0189056 · Cited by 14
“Nevertheless, as Bowers and Davis noted [44], the adaptiveness of the model to handling challenging data undermines the claim that the critical aspects of the Bayesian Reader are driven entirely by rational analysis or fundamental Bayesian principles.”
BackgroundSelf-citationPerceptions of randomness in binary sequences: Normative, heuristic, or both?
Reimers, S. J., Donkin, C., & Pelley, M. E. L. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.11.002 · Cited by 16
“For more general reviews of these positions, see Oaksford and Chater (2007), Bowers and Davis (2012), and Gigerenzer (2007).”
Sequential Decisions: A Computational Comparison of Observational and Reinforcement Accounts
Sepahvand, N. M., Stöttinger, E., Danckert, J. A., & Anderson, B. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094308 · Cited by 13
“Through our observations, and utilizing processes such as learning and heuristics [9], [10], [11], [12], we develop mental models of the processes generating a given sequence of events.”
MethodConfounding in Survey ExperimentsPreprint
Dafoe, A., Caughey, D., & Zhang, B. (2015) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.17605/osf.io/s49qh · Cited by 19
Bayesian confidence in optimal decisionsPreprint
Calder-Travis, J. M., Charles, L., Bogacz, R., & Yeung, N. (2020) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/j8sxz · Cited by 14
The illusion of internal models in biological movement
Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05963-3 · Cited by 13
“This kind of theoretical retrofitting turns modeling into a self-confirming rhetorical loop (Table 7; Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
The orbitofrontal cortex updates beliefs for state inference
Schiereck, S. S., Pérez-Rivera, D. T., Mah, A., DeMaegd, M. L., Hocker, D. L., Ward, R. M., Savin, C., & Constantinople, C. M. (2025) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2025.10.024 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bowers, Jeffrey S.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 389-414
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2147565549
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 208
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 28.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- just-so stories, Optimality Theory, unfalsifiability, utility functions, prediction accuracy, neuronal populations, rational analysis, cognitive science methodology
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Biological Evolution, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Motor Skills, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.