How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): Comment on Bowers and Davis (2012).
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Abstract
Bowers and Davis (2012) criticize Bayesian modelers for telling "just so" stories about cognition and neuroscience. Their criticisms are weakened by not giving an accurate characterization of the motivation behind Bayesian modeling or the ways in which Bayesian models are used and by not evaluating this theoretical framework against specific alternatives. We address these points by clarifying our beliefs about the goals and status of Bayesian models and by identifying what we view as the unique merits of the Bayesian approach.
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“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [50]
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Brochhagen, T. (2021) · Computational Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1007/s42113-021-00099-x · Cited by 6
“Instead, this family of computational models aims to give teleological explanations of linguistic behavior (for discussion, see Anderson 1990, Jones and Love 2011, Griffiths et al. 2012, Frank and Jäger 2016).”
BackgroundAn optimal control approach to testing theories of human information processing constraints
Chen, X. (2015) · University of Birmingham Institutional Research Archive (University of Birmingham) · Cited by 4
Learning from conditional probabilities
Strößner, C., & Hahn, U. (2024) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105962 · Cited by 3
Hahn, U. (2025) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-020425-020958 · Cited by 6
“Though these applications may shed light on that question as a by-product, their goal is not to establish the cognitive system as optimal (see also Griffiths et al. 2012 for related points on Bayesian modelling).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (GB)
- University of Rochester (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 415-422
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2108264376
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 10.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Archive ouverte UNIGE (University of Geneva) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- Bayesian model, Bayesian inference, just-so stories, cognitive explanation
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Humans, Mental Processes, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.