How the Bayesians got their beliefs (and what those beliefs actually are): Comment on Bowers and Davis (2012).
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bowers and Davis (2012) criticize Bayesian modelers for telling "just so" stories about cognition and neuroscience. Their criticisms are weakened by not giving an accurate characterization of the motivation behind Bayesian modeling or the ways in which Bayesian models are used and by not evaluating this theoretical framework against specific alternatives. We address these points by clarifying our beliefs about the goals and status of Bayesian models and by identifying what we view as the unique merits of the Bayesian approach.
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“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [50]
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“1 / 1 COMMENT How the Bayesians Got Their Beliefs (and What Those Beliefs Actually Are): Comment on Bowers and Davis (2012) Thomas L. Griffiths University of California, Berkeley Nick Chater University of Warwick Dennis Norris Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, England Alexandre Pou…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (GB)
- University of Rochester (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 415-422
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2108264376
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 10.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Archive ouverte UNIGE (University of Geneva) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- Bayesian model, Bayesian inference, just-so stories, cognitive explanation
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Humans, Mental Processes, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
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