Social dilemmas among unequals
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions1–4. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans5,6 and is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfare7–10. Most previous models of reciprocity do not include inequality11–15. These models assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public goods. A framework that includes inequality shows that extreme inequality prevents cooperation, but overall welfare is maximized when endowments and productivities are aligned such that more-productive individuals receive higher endowments.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationA strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
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Self-citationTit for tat in heterogeneous populations
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Self-citationCoordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1183665 · Cited by 613
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
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Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
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Cited by
A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 · Cited by 161
“The limit of rare mutations is mathematically well understood 49–53 and has been prominently employed in previous studies of reciprocity 54–60 and beyond 61–65 .”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hauser, O. P., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2019-08-15
- Volume
- 572
- Issue
- 7770
- Pages
- 524-527
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2963244439
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 37.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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