Cited by 176Opinion Dynamics and Social InfluenceComplex Network Analysis TechniquesGame Theory and Voting Systems

Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions

Stewart, Alexander J., Mosleh, Mohsen, Diakonova, Marina, Arechar, Antonio A., Rand, David G., Plotkin, Joshua B.·2019·Nature

Abstract

People must integrate disparate sources of information when making decisions, especially in social contexts. But information does not always flow freely. It can be constrained by social networks 1-3 and distorted by zealots and automated bots 4. Here we develop a voter game as a model system to study information flow in collective decisions. Players are assigned to competing groups (parties) and placed on an 'influence network' that determines whose voting intentions each player can observe. Players are incentivized to vote according to partisan interest, but also to coordinate their vote with the entire group. Our mathematical analysis uncovers a phenomenon that we call information gerrymandering: the structure of the influence network can sway the vote outcome towards one party, even when both parties have equal sizes and each player has the same influence. A small number of zealots, when strategically placed on the influence network, can also induce information gerrymandering and thereby bias vote outcomes. We confirm the predicted effects of information gerrymandering in social network experiments with n = 2,520 human subjects. Furthermore, we identify extensive information gerrymandering in real-world influence networks, including online political discussions leading up to the US federal elections, and in historical patterns of bill co-sponsorship in the US Congress and European legislatures. Our analysis provides an account of the vulnerabilities of collective decision-making to systematic distortion by restricted information flow. Our analysis also highlights a group-level social dilemma: information gerrymandering can enable one party to sway decisions in its favour, but when multiple parties engage in gerrymandering the group loses its ability to reach consensus and remains trapped in deadlock.

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Crossref · 10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6

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  • Recent work suggests that network structural effects can lead to "information gerrymandering" that induces undemocratic outcomes whereby a majority of the electorate votes against the electorate's interest.

    “Recent work suggests that network structural effects can lead to “information gerrymandering” that induces undemocratic outcomes whereby a majority of the electorate votes against the electorate’s interest”

    From Stewardship of global collective behavior (2021) · cites this paper as [97]

  • Even a small number of agents with aggressive attitudes can have a substantial influence on the majority view (information gerrymandering).

    “even a small number of agents with aggressive attitudes can have a substantial influence on the majority view, a process called “information gerrymandering” (66).”

    From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [66]

  • Exposure to polarizing attitudes even produced by a small number of agents can have a devastating effect on political compromise in a social network.

    “Exposure to polarizing attitudes even produced by a small number of agents can have a devastating effect on political compromise in a social network”

    From Troll and divide: the language of online polarization (2022) · cites this paper as [66]

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Authors
Stewart, A. J., Mosleh, M., Diakonova, M., Arechar, A. A., Rand, D. G., & Plotkin, J. B.
Affiliations
  • University of Houston (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
  • Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (MX)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author
Stewart, Alexander J.
Venue
Nature
Published
2019-09-04
Volume
573
Issue
7772
Pages
117-121
ISSN
  • 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4687
OpenAlex
W2972275627
Cited by
176
References
29
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 48 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 6
FWCI
12.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
group decision making, influence networks, Zealots, bots, social dilemmas, democratic legitimacy, information flow, political polarization, online political discussion, United States Congress
MeSH terms
Decision Making, Democracy, Game Theory, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Politics, Truth Disclosure, Bias, Knowledge, Social Networking, Social Media

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