Illusions of techno-nationalism.
Open accessAbstract
Current techno-nationalism presents new risks in international business, amplifying volatility, uncertainty, and complexity for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This study explains how today's techno-nationalism differs from its traditional form, the underlying theoretic logic, the damage it may cause to MNEs, and what MNEs can do to contain the potential harm. We elaborate on several points: (1) new techno-nationalism combines geopolitical, economic, national security, and ideological considerations, and is thus more complex and disruptive to international business than the traditional standpoint; (2) new techno-nationalism is underpinned by the realism doctrine, which portrays the world as zero-sum competition in which states leverage their power of economic coercion, and does not recognize the importance of technological interconnectivity, resource complementarity, open innovation, and positive-sum co-opetition; (3) techno-nationalism obstructs MNEs, especially those dependent on the global technology supply chain and on target country market contribution; and (4) MNEs can respond to techno-nationalism, defensively or offensively, contingent upon their exposure and ability to manage the risks associated with related policies.
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Claims the paper makes
7 of 68 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation
WIPO data show China ahead in each of the four IP-rights categories it files and grants, above the US, Germany, Japan, and others.
“However, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), China leads in all four categories of intellectual property rights filed to and granted by WIPO in recent years, exceeding the US, Germany, Japan, and others (see Table 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites WIPO
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisenone given
When domestic competition intensifies and domestic industries mature, governments impose new constraints on foreign investors' post-entry operations and technological requirements.
“However, when domestic market competition intensifies and domestic industries mature, governments heighten new constraints on post-entry operational activities and technological requirement from foreign investors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
New techno-nationalism merges geopolitical, economic, national-security, and ideological factors, making it more complex and disruptive for international business than the older form.
“new techno-nationalism combines geopolitical, economic, national security, and ideological considerations, and is thus more complex and disruptive to international business than the traditional standpoint”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Differences in ideological values may also drive the resurgence of competitive techno-nationalist policies.
“Differences in ideological values may also prompt the resurgence of competitive techno-nationalist policies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The competing ideologies of new techno-nationalism can further fracture the international system in ways not seen since the US-Russia Cold War rivalry.
“The competing ideologies of new techno-nationalism can further fracture the international system in ways not seen since the rivalry between the US and Russia during the Cold War”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Keohane & Nye, 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Current techno-nationalism creates new risks for international business by increasing volatility, uncertainty, and complexity for multinational enterprises.
“Current techno-nationalism presents new risks in international business, amplifying volatility, uncertainty, and complexity for multinational enterprises (MNEs).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Techno-nationalism impedes MNEs, particularly those reliant on global technology supply chains and target-country market contributions.
“techno-nationalism obstructs MNEs, especially those dependent on the global technology supply chain and on target country market contribution”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Techno-nationalism under an open-door policy provides institutionally supportive FDI policies that can foster growth in technologically advanced industries.
“This activity characterizes “techno-nationalism under open door policy” (Luo, 2002), offering institutionally supportive policies toward FDI that can foster the growth of technologically advanced industries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Luo, 2002
- Premisecitation
Global interconnectivity in the technology supply chain is much harder to disentangle today than a decade ago.
“Today, global interconnectivity in the technological supply chain becomes vastly more difficult to disentangle than even a decade ago”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites BCG, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Sharing interdependent resources or taking collective actions can create payoffs for both MNEs and governments.
“We see this effort as important because sharing interdependent resources or taking collective actions can create payoffs for both MNEs and governments (Boddewyn, 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Boddewyn, 2016 source
- Premisecitation
Technological co-development with global partners enables an area of MNE growth.
“Technological co-development with global partners enables an area of MNE growth (Doz & Wilson, 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Doz & Wilson, 2012
- Interpretationcitation
As ICT becomes foundational infrastructure in the digital age, techno-nationalism in ICT spheres obstructs many MNEs' global value chain activities.
“As ICT becomes a foundational infrastructure in the digital age, many MNEs’ global value chain activities are obstructed by techno-nationalism in ICT spheres”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sacks, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
In international joint ventures or alliances, foreign investors' technologies are valued and treated as a major part of their investment.
“in cases of international joint ventures or alliances, foreign investors’ technologies are valued and accounted for as a major source of their investment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Contractor & Narayanan, 1990 source
- Interpretationreasoning
New techno-nationalist policies can damage private companies more than state-owned ones.
“techno-nationalism may more strongly harm these privately owned firms than state counterparts”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The main source of competitiveness of emerging powers such as China comes from the private sector.
- Premisecitation
Collaborative global innovation networks have become a hallmark of international business.
“Collaborative global innovation networks, a globally organized web of complex interactions between firms and other organizations engaged in knowledge and innovation development (Cantwell, 1995), have formed a hallmark of international business.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cantwell, 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
New techno-nationalism departs from the trajectory of open innovation and open competition.
“But new techno-nationalism deviates from the above trajectory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
New techno-nationalists view emerging markets as technological laggards rather than contributors.
“Second, new techno-nationalists perceive emerging markets as laggards in technology, not as contributors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Global partnerships for joint innovation play an essential role in fostering international business.
“Consequently, global partnerships for joint innovation play an essential role in fostering international business.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Evidence indicates that open innovation and open competition, supported by large public-private investments in R&D, education, human capital, and infrastructure, strengthen national competitiveness.
“Evidence shows that open innovation and open competition, with massive investments in public and private partnerships around R&D, education, and human capital development, as well as physical and institutional infrastructures, strengthen country competitiveness”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Trumpian techno-nationalism has caused collateral damage to US firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, and Intel, which do billions of dollars of business with Huawei alone.
“For instance, Trumpian techno-nationalism has wrought collateral damage on US firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Intel, and others, which do billions of dollars of business with Huawei alone”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Capri, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Bertrand et al. (2016) show that when home countries lack political affinity with a host country, MNEs face more host-government interventions and barriers when entering that market.
“Bertrand et al. (2016) show that when home countries lack political affinity in international affairs with a host country, MNEs experience more interventions and barriers from the host government when entering that market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bertrand et al. (2016) source
- Premisecitation
Key subsidiaries in emerging markets increasingly act as global innovators and sources of knowledge for both the host country and the MNE's global operations.
“Key subsidiaries in emerging markets increasingly play a role as global innovators, serving as a fountainhead of knowledge not just for the focal host country, but also for the MNE’s global reach”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Meyer, 2004 source
- Premisenone given
In wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries, MNEs retain full control and ownership of the technologies they deploy.
“In cases of wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries, MNEs have full control and ownership of their technologies deployed to these subsidiaries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Unilateral sanctions arising from one country's techno-nationalism can become bilateral and trigger recursive attacks in an economically interdependent world.
“Unilateral sanctions due to one country’s techno-nationalism can easily become bilateral and cause recursive attacks in an economically interdependent world”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Manning, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Research indicates a rise in reverse innovation, where innovations are first adopted in emerging economies and later copied elsewhere, including developed countries.
“Similarly, research shows an increase in reverse innovation, in which an innovation is first adopted in emerging economies and later copied in the rest of the world, including developed countries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011 source
- Interpretationreasoning
When a multinational's resource complementarity and goal congruence with governments increase, its relationship with the host government becomes more cooperative and less competitive.
“When a multinational’s resource complementarity and goal congruence with governments strengthen, MNE-host country government relationships become more cooperative and less competitive.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A nationalistic view of technology restricts competitive co-opetition in favor of a zero-sum mentality.
“Yet a nationalistic view of technology limits competitive co-opetition in favor of a zero-sum mentality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
State-owned firms enjoy political and institutional privileges, including government support.
“State-owned firms certainly enjoy political and institutional privileges, including governmental supports”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jackson & Deeg, 2008 source
- Interpretationnone given
Concrete measures of new techno-nationalism vary between countries in industry focus, aggressiveness or scope of decoupling, and coordination with other countries.
“7 Concrete measures of new techno-nationalism may vary between countries in terms of (1) industry focus to be protected or access denial against foreign firms; (2) aggressiveness of decoupling or scope of access denial; and (3) coordination with other countries, especially in the same region.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Protective policies make it more difficult for springboard MNEs to acquire critical strategic assets through radical FDI, restraining feasible opportunities for capability acquisition.
“The protective policies make it more difficult for springboard MNEs to acquire critical strategic assets through radical FDI, thus restraining feasible opportunities for capability acquisition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Tightly coupled MNEs, characterized by high market and technology dependence, are highly exposed to threats from techno-nationalism.
“Tightly coupled MNEs, characterized by high levels of both market dependence and technology dependence (e.g., US’s Caterpillar and GM in China or China’s Huawei in Europe), are highly exposed to threats posed by techno-nationalism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
- Interpretationreasoning
The actual relocation cost for technologically coupled MNEs depends on how many local technologies or components they depend on, whether alternatives are procurable and financially viable, and how tightly coupled those technologies are with other value chain activities in the same host country.
“The actual relocation cost for technologically coupled MNEs will hinge on how many local technologies or components they depend on, whether these technologies are procurable and financially viable from alternative countries, and how tightly coupled these technologies are with other value chain activities that the firm conducts in the same host country.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
For tightly coupled MNEs, decoupling is rather costly.
“For these MNEs, decoupling becomes rather costly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Dependencies impose constraints that drive MNEs to adopt dependence-managing strategies.
“Such dependencies impose constraints, in turn driving MNEs to take dependence-managing strategies (Hillman & Wan, 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hillman & Wan, 2005 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Many MNEs, large and small, from assumed rival countries are adversely affected by new techno-nationalist restrictions.
“Finally, many MNEs, large and small, from the assumed rival countries are likewise adversely affected by new techno-nationalist restrictions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Some countries are assumed to be rival countries in the context of techno-nationalism.
- Interpretationreasoning
Techno-nationalistic practice can create a battle that cuts both ways, as illustrated by China's response to Trump-era measures against Chinese tech firms.
“The practice may also create a battle that cuts both ways. For instance, in the aftermath of Trump techno-nationalism against Chinese tech firms, China’s government ordered public institutions and government agencies to stop using foreign-made computers and software, a move obviously aimed at American companies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
If protective practices expand or become more extraterritorial and reciprocal, even loosely coupled MNEs can be adversely affected because of global interdependence of technologies and components.
“But with the protective practice expanding or becoming more extraterritorial and reciprocal, even loosely coupled MNEs can be adversely affected due to global interdependence of various technologies and components (Garcia-Herrero, 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Garcia-Herrero, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation
Sanctions and export controls of the type used by the Trump administration could threaten US national security by cutting the US off from collaboration and innovative potential that sustained its dynamism and technology leadership.
“Sanctions and export controls of this type could potentially threaten US national security because they could cut the US off from the collaboration and innovative potential that have sustained its dynamism and made possible its leadership in technology frontiers (Rajan, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rajan, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
International or regional diversification, including reorganizing global value chains and relocating FDI sites, is a viable option to mitigate dependence-related risks.
“First, international or regional diversification (including reorganizing global value chain and relocating FDI sites) forms a viable option to mitigate dependence-related risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
MNE vulnerability to new techno-nationalism varies along technological and geographic dependencies.
“The above discussion illustrates variance in vulnerability to new techno-nationalism across MNEs, along both technological and geographic dependencies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
- Premisecitation
IB risk management research indicates that political, financial, and transactional risks are determined by a focal MNE's exposure to or dependence on specific environments that cause the threats.
“IB risk management research indicates that political, financial, and transactional risks are determined by a focal MNE’s exposure to or dependence on specific environments that cause the threats (Miller, 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Miller, 1998 source
- Interpretationcitation
A nationalistic view of technology may create a vicious cycle that obstructs international business.
“Finally, a nationalistic view of technology may result in a vicious cycle of obstruction to international business.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Excessive and abrupt techno-nationalistic measures deter international business and the global economy that could otherwise generate greater benefits for society.
“We do not suggest that governments should not regulate multinational companies, but we do submit that excessive and abrupt techno-nationalistic measures deter international business and the global economy that could otherwise generate greater benefits for society.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The Trump administration was guided by the belief that economic security is national security.
“4The Trump administration was guided by the belief that “economic security is national security” (Moore, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Moore, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Loosely or non-coupled MNEs have the least exposure to techno-nationalism risk because of low market and technology dependence.
“Finally, loosely or non-coupled MNEs enjoy the least exposure to risk by techno-nationalism due to low levels of both market dependence and technology dependence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
- Interpretationreasoning
Political realism does not accord with many IB theories that assume cross-border interconnectivity and collaboration.
“This doctrine does not accord with many IB theories that assume cross-border interconnectivity and collaboration.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 43
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 27
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNew techno-nationalism is deeply intertwined with geopolitics and drives worldwide de-globalization and decoupling with structural changes.
“New techno-nationalism mingles deeply and intricately with geopolitics, propelling a new time of worldwide de-globalization and decoupling with structural changes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites Buckley, 2020 source
The Conclusion (What is New Empirically; page unavailable) links techno-nationalism to fractured global value chains, and Ambiguity (Empirics: A Bifurcated World Order; page unavailable) connects it to US–China competition and structural change. But Ambiguity (China as the Other; page unavailable) cautions that a clean break is limited by interlinked global networks. The claim overstates the paper by presenting worldwide de-globalization and decoupling as an established outcome. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Petricevic & Teece, 2019 source
The Introduction identifies neo-techno-nationalism as a force reshaping the global economic order, and the VUCA section links that reshaping to geopolitical shifts, de-globalization tendencies, and possible value-chain decoupling. The claim overstates the paper’s qualifications: it presents worldwide de-globalization and decoupling as outcomes already being propelled, whereas the paper describes tendencies and says value chains may be moving toward decoupling. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Witt, 2019 source
The opening discussion (p. 2) identifies politics as a key driver of de-globalization and describes US–China geostrategic competition as a possible trigger. The Abstract (p. 1) predicts qualitative changes in international-business structures. But the paper does not identify “new techno-nationalism” as the driver or establish the claimed worldwide decoupling; its technology-related discussion does not make that connection. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationTraditional techno-nationalists hold that national R&D efforts are key drivers of a nation's overall growth, sustainability, and prosperity.
“Traditional techno-nationalists believe that the presence and effectiveness of national R&D efforts are key drivers to the overall growth, sustainability, and prosperity of a nation”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Edgerton, 2007 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRealism treats international politics as anarchic, with no overarching authority able to enforce rules, so state survival ultimately depends on hard power in a zero-sum game.
“Realism carries the assumption that ultimately no rules constrain state behavior as no overarching authority exists that could enforce compliance. In the anarchic world of realism, securing survival occurs ultimately as a function of hard power (military, economic, and political) under a zero-sum game (Witt, 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Witt, 2019 source
The Realism section (p. 8) explicitly describes anarchy as the absence of an overarching authority to enforce rules, and says survival depends on hard power in a zero-sum game. It identifies military power and economic strength, but does not identify political power as a form of hard power; on p. 11, it names military and economic power as the two central dimensions. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMNEs can build competitive advantages through horizontal collaboration with global competitors or vertical collaboration with suppliers and distributors.
“Research reveals that MNEs can build competitive advantages through collaboration with global competitors (horizontal cooperation) or with suppliers and distributors (vertical cooperation) (Kano et al., 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Kano et al., 2020 source
The Network structure section links horizontal ties among local firms and vertical MNE–supplier ties to improved innovation performance. The Learning section also says lead firms benefit from stronger supplier capabilities. Neither passage establishes the claimed collaboration with global competitors or distributors as routes to MNE competitive advantage; no page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationWhen the US uses extraterritorial sanctions to block non-US firms' trade and financial dealings with a target country, it coercively turns national measures into global ones and breaches other states' sovereignty.
“It is quite another for the government to use extraterritorial sanctions to block trade and financial activities by non-US companies against that target country—in other words, to coercively turn national actions into global measures, in breach of the sovereignty of other states (Mann & Daly, 2020).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Mann & Daly, 2020 source
The Introduction discusses US attempts to exert power over extraterritorial conduct, and Main Contributions describes US use of internet companies to extend its power beyond its borders. Neither passage addresses extraterritorial sanctions blocking non-US firms’ trade or financial dealings, or says that such measures breach other states’ sovereignty. Searches for sanctions, trade restrictions, and sovereignty found no passage establishing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.74)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenPolitical realism provides a theoretical foundation for new techno-nationalist actions that can undermine international business operations.
“We show that political realism forms a theoretical basis for new techno-nationalist actions that could undermine international business operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenMNEs may respond to techno-nationalism either defensively or offensively, depending on their exposure and capacity to manage policy-related risks.
“MNEs can respond to techno-nationalism, defensively or offensively, contingent upon their exposure and ability to manage the risks associated with related policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationDigital connectivity promotes globalization, but digital technologies also create downsides that fuel techno-nationalist sentiment.
“As a consensus, digital connectivity promotes globalization, but digital technologies do produce downsides, which in turn propel a techno-nationalist sentiment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Archibugi & Michie, 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites DeNardis, 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites van Tulder et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenMarket and technology dependence are firm-specific contingencies that shape an MNE's exposure to new techno-nationalist disruptions.
“The framework also explains market and technology dependence as firm-specific contingencies that determine the MNE’s exposure to new techno-nationalist disruptions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationUnder new techno-nationalism, leaders pursue geopolitical gains based on the premise that the world has entered a new era of systemic rivalry among powerhouses with different ideological values, political systems, and economic models.
“Under new techno-nationalism, country leaders seek to attain geopolitical gains, building on the premise that the world has entered a new era of systemic rivalry between competing geopolitical powerhouses that differ markedly in ideological values, political systems, and economic models”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Farrell & Newman, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Garcia-Herrero, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn a world of relative gains, state leaders have an incentive to cut or eliminate economic ties with rivals if they believe those ties benefit rivals more.
“In this world of relative gains, state leaders have an incentive to curtail or eliminate economic ties with rivals if they believe that these ties benefit their rivals relatively more”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Beitz, 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ostry & Nelson, 1995
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the mid and late 1990s, many developing and emerging-economy governments began welcoming FDI and recognizing the value of native innovation and local technological advancement.
“In the mid and late 1990s, governments of many developing and emerging economies began to welcome FDI and realize the importance of native innovation and local technological advancement”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Meyer, 2004 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationNew techno-nationalism is a form of systematic competition thinking that ties cross-border technology exchanges to national security and advocates strong state intervention against opportunistic or hostile foreign state and non-state actors.
“New techno-nationalism is a strain of systematic competition thinking that links cross-border technological exchanges directly to a nation’s national security, advocating for strong interventions by the state against opportunistic or hostile state and non-state actors from other countries”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Moore, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Sacks, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe realism doctrine underpins new techno-nationalism; it depicts the world as zero-sum competition where states use economic coercion and overlooks technological interconnectivity, resource complementarity, open innovation, and positive-sum co-opetition.
“new techno-nationalism is underpinned by the realism doctrine, which portrays the world as zero-sum competition in which states leverage their power of economic coercion, and does not recognize the importance of technological interconnectivity, resource complementarity, open innovation, and positive-sum co-opetition”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNew techno-nationalism relies on a zero-sum bargaining logic, but in an interconnected world with interdependent technological components and supply chains, technological complementarity is widespread and allows co-opetition to prevail.
“First, the view builds on the bargaining logic, in which the game is truly zero-sum (Boddewyn, 2016), but in an interconnected world, in which technological components (or supply chains) are interdependent, technological complementarity widely occurs between countries and between cross-border companies (Doz & Wilson, 2012), allowing for the co-opetition logic to prevail.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Boddewyn, 2016 source
- cites Doz & Wilson, 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenTraditional techno-nationalist policies aim to strengthen domestic industries' competitiveness against foreign rivals.
“In general, techno-nationalist policies are designed to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic industries against foreign rivals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationGlobal open resources foster innovation and speed, creating positive-sum competition through complementary collaboration.
“Here, global open resources foster innovation and speed, creating positive-sum completion through complementary collaboration”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cantwell, 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPolitical realism holds that in an anarchic world states seek to maximize their power relative to others to improve their survival chances.
“This doctrine, as we detail below, holds that, in an ultimately anarchic world, states focus on maximizing their power relative to others to increase their own chances of survival”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Waltz, 1979
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNew techno-nationalism reduces global open innovation, potentially creating competitive disadvantages for affected MNEs.
“New techno-nationalism depreciates global open innovation, which may lead to competitive disadvantages for affected MNEs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNew techno-nationalists underestimate the collateral damage to their own country's businesses and trade retaliation from target countries.
“Finally, new techno-nationalists underestimate collateral damages on the nation’s own businesses and trade revenges from target countries.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationCompared with the traditional form, new techno-nationalism is more short-term opportunistic and sometimes hard to justify rationally and ethically.
“Relative to traditional, new techno-nationalism is more short-term opportunistic (Legrain, 2020) and sometimes becomes difficult to justify both rationally and ethically”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Legrain, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Farrell & Newman, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationTraditional techno-nationalism embraced globalization as a way to upgrade local economies and industry, while the new version rejects globalization and restricts technology inflows and outflows in certain sectors or domains.
“Traditional techno-nationalism embraced globalization, notably global technologies, as a means to upgrade local economies and industrial development (Archibugi & Michie, 1995), whereas today’s version denounces globalization, imposing regulatory restrictions against both technology inflows from and outflows to other countries in certain sectors or technological domains”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Archibugi & Michie, 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Moore, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMNE political responses are not static and differ across firms; leaders adjust their political behavior to environmental or organizational conditions that affect cooperation or competition with governments.
“In this co-opetition view, enterprise political responses do not remain at a standstill, nor do different MNEs act the same way (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Leaders of international firms adjust their political behavior to align with changes in environmental or organizational conditions that affect cooperation or competition with governments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBoth realism and liberalism focus on the nation-state and neglect the role of international businesses, including MNEs, in shaping international relations; realism in particular rejects market and business influence on state policies and ignores their damages.
“Both political realism and liberalism focus on the nation state as the level of analysis and shy away from explaining the role of international businesses in shaping international relations. For realists, states are the only strategic actors in international relations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mansfield, 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPrivate companies in China account for about 60% of GDP, 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment, and 90% of new jobs.
“privately owned companies in China contribute about 60% of China’s GDP, 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment, and 90% of new jobs”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zitelmann, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningModern techno-nationalism may obstruct technological co-development and cause a breakdown of the global value chain.
“Yet, modern techno-nationalism may present obstacles to this co-development and cause a breakdown of the global value chain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the 20th century innovation and knowledge flowed mainly from developed to developing countries, but in the 21st century these flows are mutual and bilateral between advanced and emerging economies.
“In the 20th century, innovation and knowledge were largely transferred from developed countries to developing countries. However, in the 21st century, these flows are mutual and bilateral, involving flows of knowledge and innovation between advanced and emerging economies in both directions (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationTraditional techno-nationalism was mainly adopted for developmental goals, whereas new techno-nationalism is used mainly by advanced economies in the name of national security.
“The traditional form was principally adopted (preferred also by developing countries) for developmental objectives (Kim & Nelson, 2000; Ostry & Nelson, 1995), while new techno-nationalism is employed mainly by advanced economies primarily in the name of national security”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Kim & Nelson, 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ostry & Nelson, 1995
- cites Moore, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationGlobalization emerges when a hegemon creates and maintains international institutions governing trade and investment for its own benefit.
“Globalization rises when an overwhelmingly powerful country, a “hegemon,” creates and maintains, for its own benefit, sets of international institutions (“regimes”) that govern aspects such as trade and investments”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Keohane, 1980
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the co-opetition view, MNEs and foreign governments remain interdependent and have increasingly cooperated on competitiveness improvement over the last three decades, even though competition and bargaining persist.
“While competition or bargaining still holds to fulfill the respective goals of multinational firms and foreign governments, the two parties are interdependent and, in the last three decades, cooperate along competitiveness improvement (Meyer, 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Meyer, 2004 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningDigital technologies reduce costs of communication, coordination, and sharing, thereby bolstering possible collaboration advantages.
“Digital technologies further bolster these possible advantages by reducing costs associated with communication, coordination, and sharing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPolitical realism stresses the competitive and conflictual side of international politics.
“Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mansfield, 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Wight, 1991
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPolitical liberalism holds that international institutions and interdependence help states reduce conflict and, with proper institutions and diplomacy, maximize prosperity and minimize conflict, with trade and investment facilitating that goal.
“Political liberalism, on the other hand, holds that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states. With these international institutions, and increasing interdependence (including economic and cultural exchanges), states have the opportunity to reduce conflict.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Beitz, 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNew techno-nationalism treats target countries as adversaries, which can cause serious consequences for MNEs from home, host, and third countries.
“However, new techno-nationalism places target countries as adversaries, a stance that can cause serious consequences for multinational enterprises from home, host, and even third countries.8”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationCross-border connectivity reduces inter-firm coordination and transaction costs, allowing multinationals to use a global pool of expertise and resources, but techno-nationalistic policies may impede access to that pool.
“As cross-border connectivity, physically and virtually, reduces inter-firm coordination and transaction costs, multinationals take advantage of a global pool of expertise and resources (Farrell & Newman, 2020), but techno-nationalistic policies may impede access to this pool.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Farrell & Newman, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCross-border collaborative activities enhance interoperability between networked products and services, accelerate access to new foreign markets, and lower production and development costs.
“As highlighted by Lessard et al. (2013), cross-border collaborative activities enhance the interoperability between networked products and services, accelerate access to new foreign markets, and lower production and development costs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lessard et al. (2013)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNew techno-nationalism closely accompanies political realism, portraying the world as competitive and conflictual and holding that states should use their bargaining power even when unethical.
“New techno-nationalism occurs keenly in tandem with the political realism theory in international relations, portraying the world as competing and conflictual and holding that, in response to such zero-sum competition, states should leverage their bargaining power even if not ethical”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Beitz, 1997
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe resurgence of techno-nationalism in 5G, AI, and the internet of things impedes cooperative R&D and could trigger market fragmentation and incompatible standards and norms.
“Research suggests that the resurgence of techno-nationalism in areas such as 5G, AI, and the internet of things impedes cooperative R&D and could trigger both market fragmentation and incompatible standards and norms (BCG, 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites BCG, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningCollective actions by MNEs to influence governmental policies require coordination among participating firms and incentives to do so, because firms are idiosyncratic in their contributing power.
“Of note, these collective actions require, on the one hand, coordination among participating firms and, on the other hand, incentives to do so, as firms are idiosyncratic in their contributing power.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMarket-coupled MNEs, which are heavily dependent on a foreign market but have low technological coupling with that country, experience moderate exposure to techno-nationalism risks, though potential losses can be enormous depending on the market's revenue contribution.
“Market-coupled MNEs refer to those heavily dependent on the foreign market but with a low level of technological coupling with the country (e.g., Qualcomm or Micron in China, or China’s Xiaomi in India). These firms experience moderate exposure to risks induced by techno-nationalism, yet potential losses can be enormous, conditional upon the revenue contribution of this market to the firm’s total”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningPolitical realism may provide one root cause or deeper reason behind techno-nationalist thinking.
“The political realism philosophy may provide one root cause or a deeper reason behind this line of thought.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTechno-nationalism escalates complexity, uncertainty, and the difficulty of managing globally integrated supply chains.
“Techno-nationalism escalates this complexity and uncertainty as well as the difficulty to manage globally integrated supply chains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTechnologically coupled MNEs are less exposed to new techno-nationalism than tightly coupled ones but remain moderately susceptible to its risks.
“Technologically coupled MNEs stand less exposed to new techno-nationalism than tightly coupled ones, but are still moderately susceptible to its risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenPolitical realism depicts nation states as primary agents that maximize or ought to maximize their power and holds that a nation state can only advance its interests against other nations' interests.
“The theory depicts nation states as the primary agents that maximize, or ought to maximize, their power. It holds, too, that a nation state can only advance its interests against the interests of other nations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe capacity to innovate and produce advanced technologies relies on international scientific cooperation, movement of people and ideas, and international supply chains.
“However, the capacity to innovate and produce advanced technologies relies on international scientific cooperation, the movement of people and ideas, and international supply chains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationEconomic interdependence is mutual and multi-layered, making techno-nationalistic attacks and counterattacks easily vicious and endless.
“Worth noting, economic interdependence is not only mutual but also involves many layers, making techno-nationalistic attacks and counterattacks easily vicious and endless (Rajan, 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rajan, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningNew techno-nationalism tends to underestimate unintended consequences in a variety of international businesses from and in many countries.
“Second, new techno-nationalism tends to underestimate unintended consequences in a variety of international businesses from and in a multitude of countries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenNew techno-nationalism underscores the need to protect a country's own scientific knowledge and hinder other states' innovation capabilities.
“8New techno-nationalism underscores the need to protect a country’s own scientific knowledge and to hinder other states’ innovation capabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningPolitical realism becomes a dictating mindset for new techno-nationalists who use power to fundamentally change geopolitical parameters for many MNEs.
“But it becomes a dictating mindset for new techno-nationalists who use their power to fundamentally change the geopolitical parameters for many MNEs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMaintaining end-to-end transparency and integrity of the supply chain, such as through IoT or blockchain, enables real-time tracing of goods and digital products, likely becoming critical for compliance with heightened scrutiny and potentially a competitive differentiator amid cybersecurity concerns.
“Maintaining end-to-end transparency and integrity of the supply chain, such as through the internet of things or blockchain, which enables goods and digital products to be traced in real time, will likely become increasingly critical for compliance with heightened scrutiny and could potentially serve as a competitive differentiator in a world with high cybersecurity concerns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNew techno-nationalism is often difficult to hedge and severely affects maintenance of global value chain operations.
“Unfortunately, new techno-nationalism is often difficult to hedge and brings severe impact on maintaining global value chain operations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTightly coupled MNEs face amplified contradictions between local laws and global corporate policies under new techno-nationalism, prompting them to split global value chains into different streams requiring unique governance and risk management.
“Tightly coupled MNEs, for instance, face amplified contradictions between local laws and global corporate policies under new techno-nationalism, provoking them to split global value chains into different streams, each requiring unique governance and risk management.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNational security concerns have been overly used by new techno-nationalists in today's geopolitical climate, even though the line between economic and security concerns is harder to distinguish than two decades ago.
“While it is true that the line between economic and security concerns is harder to distinguish today than two decades ago, national security concerns have been overly used by new techno-nationalists in today’s geopolitical climate (Farrell & Newman, 2020; Sacks, 2020).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Farrell & Newman, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Sacks, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningChoices of MNE actions may be limited because new techno-nationalism occurs chiefly as geopolitical and ideological stances.
“Yet choices of actions may be limited because new techno-nationalism occurs chiefly as geopolitical and ideological stances.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: New techno-nationalism occurs chiefly as geopolitical and ideological stances rather than as economic or commercial policy.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationGlobal value chain governance is largely determined by transaction complexity, the ability to codify and process transactions, and the capabilities of managing supply bases.
“According to Gereffi et al. (2005), global value chain governance is largely determined by the complexity of transactions, the ability to codify and process transactions, and the capabilities of managing supply bases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gereffi et al. (2005) source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMNEs differ in their exposure and responses to risks from techno-nationalism, and international business may fade if new techno-nationalism and other geopolitical disruptions continue.
“As our conceptual framework (Figure 1) illustrates, MNEs differ in their exposure and responses to risks arising from techno-nationalism. The framework suggests that international business may fade if new techno-nationalism and other geopolitical disruptions continue.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRelocating one product or value chain activity between countries may be reasonably doable, but relocating many activities is a daunting challenge.
“Relocating one product or one value chain activity between countries may be reasonably doable, but relocating many activities between countries becomes a daunting challenge.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf market similarity between a target country and alternative countries is abundant, market substitutability is high, lowering market exit and switch costs.
“If abundant market similarity exists between the target country and alternative countries that the firm wants to switch or relocate to, then market substitutability will be high, hence lowering market exit and switch costs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTechno-nationalism unfolds in two directions: domestically investing in military technologies and blocking non-ally countries from accessing such technologies.
“Techno-nationalism unfolds in two directions: domestically investing in military technologies and blocking non-ally countries from accessing such technologies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTechnological and digital decoupling may benefit some firms in the short term, but its long-term positivity for most international businesses and global stakeholders is difficult to justify.
“In short, technological and digital decoupling may benefit some firms in the short term, but it is difficult to justify its long-term positivity for most international businesses and global stakeholders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationGlobalization has not slowed with respect to digital and data flow; cross-border data flow is as strong as ever.
“1Globalization, however, has not slowed down with respect to digital and data flow. The cross-border flow of data is as strong as ever (McKinsey, 2020).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McKinsey, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
The paper relies on this without support.
The main source of competitiveness of emerging powers such as China comes from the private sector.
“the main source of competitiveness of such emerging powers comes from the private sector”
The paper relies on this without support.
Joint venture parties, not local authorities, negotiated and determined the pricing or valuation of technologies.
“This form of investment gained in popularity because joint venture parties, not local authorities, negotiated and determined the pricing or valuation of such technologies.”
The paper relies on this without support.
New techno-nationalism occurs chiefly as geopolitical and ideological stances rather than as economic or commercial policy.
“Yet choices of actions may be limited because new techno-nationalism occurs chiefly as geopolitical and ideological stances.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Some countries are assumed to be rival countries in the context of techno-nationalism.
“Finally, many MNEs, large and small, from the assumed rival countries are likewise adversely affected by new techno-nationalist restrictions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
MNE exposure to techno-nationalism can be adequately characterized by levels of market dependence and technology dependence.
“As our conceptual framework (Figure 1) illustrates, MNEs differ in their exposure and responses to risks arising from techno-nationalism.”
“Figure 3 illustrates the differences along levels of market dependence (the extent to which the MNE depends on the target foreign country that is now restricted for technology flows) and technology dependence (the extent to which the MNE relies on technological components or support offered by businesses from the target country).”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
It is estimated that by 2025, 24.3% of the global economy will be digital (amounting to USD 23 trillion), compared to its share of 15.5% in 2016.
“It is estimated that by 2025, 24.3% of the global economy will be digital (amounting to USD 23 trillion), comparing to its share of 15.5% in 2016.”
From China’s Digital Silk Road in the Age of the Digital Economy: Political Analysis (2022) · cites this paper as [19]
The Notes discuss continued digital and data flows, and the section on strategic responses discusses digital technologies, but neither gives an estimate of the digital economy’s size. Searches for the 2025 and 2016 figures and for the digital economy’s share found no passage supporting the stated percentages or USD 23 trillion figure. (LLM, conf=0.74)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredChina's digital economy rules focus on facilitation of global logistics, cross-border payments and other services, and cross-border trade in goods, but the legal system for digital intellectual property protection is not yet perfect, and shortcomings of digital governance rules may bring greater challenges to the DSR.
“In addition, China's digital economy rules focus on the facilitation of global logistics, cross-border payments and other services, and cross-border trade in goods, however the legal system for digital intellectual property protection is not yet perfect, and the shortcomings of digital governance rules may bring greater challenges to the DSR (Luo, 2022).”
From China’s Digital Silk Road in the Age of the Digital Economy: Political Analysis (2022) · cites this paper as Luo, 2022
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 2 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2007) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.584 · Cited by 219 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Additionally, multinational firms’ ability to effectively adopt those dependencemanaging strategies varies substantially due to the intrinsic complexities and barriers of international operations (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007).”
BackgroundRegaining the edge for international business research
Buckley, P. J., & Lessard, D. R. (2005) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400170 · Cited by 203 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Collaborative global innovation networks, a globally organized web of complex interactions between firms and other organizations engaged in knowledge and innovation development (Cantwell, 1995), have formed a hallmark of international business.”
BackgroundThe relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions
Bertrand, O., Betschinger, M., & Settles, A. (2016) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2438 · Cited by 191 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Bertrand et al. (2016) show that when home countries lack political affinity in international affairs with a host country, MNEs experience more interventions and barriers from the host government when entering that market.”
BackgroundDeveloped country MNEs investing in developing economies: Progress and prospect
Luo, Y., Zhang, H., & Bu, J. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00230-y · Cited by 176 · cited 1× · see citing works
“IB literature has richly examined the investment activities of developed country MNEs in developing countries, addressing both opportunities and threats behind these investments (see Luo et al., 2019 for review).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBrouthers, K. D., & Bamossy, G. J. (1997) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490102 · Cited by 164 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Also, because of stronger bargaining power of Western MNEs vis-à-vis local partners, the companies actually held a dominant position in determining the price of their technologies (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997).”
BackgroundChina's Next Strategic Advantage: From Imitation to Innovation
McKern, B., & Yip, G. S. (2016) · CEIBS Institutional Repository · Cited by 154 · see citing works
The future of international business research on corporate globalization that never was…
Verbeke, A., Coeurderoy, R., & Matt, T. (2018) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-018-0192-2 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology
Taylor, M. Z. (2016) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190464127.001.0001 · Cited by 149 · cited 1× · see citing works
“For instance, attracting top-notch foreign students and scholars and encouraging them to stay and work within the US’s leadingedge fields in science, engineering, and others has significantly contributed to the country’s competitiveness for a century (Ostry & Nelson, 1995; Taylor, 2016).”
BackgroundManagement of the political imperative in international business
Ring, P. S., Lenway, S. A., & Govekar, M. A. (1990) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250110206 · Cited by 145 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Ring et al. (1990) present two such essential political strategies: the forestalling strategy that proactively constructs desirable political imperatives, and the absorption strategy that strives to minimize the adverse impacts of undesirable political imperatives.”
BackgroundEconomic Sanctions and American Diplomacy
Hendrickson, D. C., & Haass, R. N. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20049083 · Cited by 137 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Council on Foreign Relations, calls ‘‘sanctions madness’’ (Haass, 1998).”
BackgroundThe theory and empirics of the structural reshaping of globalization
Buckley, P. J. (2020) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-020-00355-5 · Cited by 135 · cited 3× · see citing works
“While MNE leaders are not in a policy-setting position and may well be vulnerable to and even victimized by techno-nationalism (Evenett, 2019), they do need to respond vigilantly to increasing techno-nationalistic policies because they are primary players in globalizing R&D and technologies and at the receiving end of…”
BackgroundBoddewyn, J. J. (2016) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2015.08.009 · Cited by 120 · cited 6× · see citing works
“First, the view builds on the bargaining logic, in which the game is truly zero-sum (Boddewyn, 2016), but in an interconnected world, in which technological components (or supply chains) are interdependent, technological complementarity widely occurs between countries and between cross-border companies (Doz & Wilson,…”
BackgroundInfluentialU.S. national security and foreign direct investment
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Conflict, security, and political risk: International business in challenging times
Henisz, W. J., Mansfield, E. D., & Von Glinow, M. A. (2010) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.11 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective
Edgerton, D. E. H. (2007) · New Global Studies · doi:10.2202/1940-0004.1013 · Cited by 94 · cited 6× · see citing works
“are key drivers to the overall growth, sustainability, and prosperity of a nation (Edgerton, 2007).”
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Self-citationInternational Business in the Information and Digital Age
Piscitello, L., Tulder, R. V., & Verbeke, A. (2018) · doi:10.1108/s1745-8862201813 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Techno-globalism, techno-nationalism and technological systems: organizing the evidence
Montresor, S. (2001) · Technovation · doi:10.1016/s0166-4972(00)00061-4 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
10 rules for managing global innovation.
Wilson, K., & Doz, Y. (2012) · PubMed · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Howitt, P. (2008) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2545-1 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
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Geopolitics, jurisdiction and surveillance
Mann, M., & Daly, A. (2020) · Internet Policy Review · doi:10.14763/2020.3.1501 · Cited by 38 · cited 1× · see citing works
“It is quite another for the government to use extraterritorial sanctions to block trade and financial activities by non-US companies against that target country—in other words, to coercively turn national actions into global measures, in breach of the sovereignty of other states (Mann & Daly, 2020).”
BackgroundThe Ages of Globalization: Geography, Technology, and Institutions
Sachs, J. D. (2020) · Cited by 32 · see citing works
The borderless world: Management lessons in the new logic of the global market place
Freeman, C. T. (1992) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/0048-7333(92)90010-2 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
From Globalization to Deglobalization: Zooming Into TradePreprint
Garcı́a-Herrero, A. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3496563 · Cited by 28 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Moreover, recent studies present evidence of the decrease in merchandise, capital, and investment, as well as, to a lesser extent, people-to-people flows before the COVID-19 pandemic (Garcia-Herrero, 2020; WIR, 2020).”
BackgroundChina's next strategic advantage from imitation to innovation
Yip, G. S., & MacKern, B. (n.d.) · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Technology development in the multinational firm: a framework for planning and strategy
Contractor, F. J., & Narayanan, V. K. (1990) · R&D Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9310.1990.tb00720.x · Cited by 26 · cited 3× · see citing works
“While IB literature has long enlightened the business community on the political aspect of MNE strategies (e.g., Boddewyn, 2016; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Delios & Henisz, 2003), the political realism theory, which is the doctrine underpinning new techno-nationalism, has received little attention.”
Background"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan
Samuels, R. J. (1994) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Nuchera, A. H., & Molero, J. (2008) · World Patent Information · doi:10.1016/j.wpi.2008.11.002 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Alliance Capitalism, Innovation and the Chinese State
Higgins, V. (2015) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137529657 · Cited by 6 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…and automation for mass production), integration capabilities that combine and configure different technologies, and engineering and applications—often viewed as strengths held by some successful emerging market firms with which Western MNEs have partnered (Higgins, 2015; Yip & McKern, 2016).”
BackgroundEconomic sanctions and American diplomacy
Haass, R. (1998) · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Vicious Cross-licensing Strategy for Technology Spread: Case Study of Samsung Electronics
Gnanakumar, P. B. (2016) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-137-54468-1_14 · Cited by 1 · cited 2× · see citing works
“However, in the 21st century, these flows are mutual and bilateral, involving flows of knowledge and innovation between advanced and emerging economies in both directions (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011).”
BackgroundEconomic exposure and integrated risk management
Miller, K. D. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199805)19:5 · cited 2×
“…sentiment intensifies de-globalization and decoupling in a complex way by combining political and economic considerations, linking technological capabilities directly to a country’s national security, economic prosperity, and social stability (Graham & Marchik, 2006; Montresor, 2001; Reich, 1987).”
Background(1995)
Flagged first, then by citations
9 of the 77 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 6
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act
Luo, Y., & Assche, A. V. (2023) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-023-00620-3 · Cited by 355 · see citing works
“policies, and relocating strategic investments from geopolitically risky countries to ‘‘neutral’’ ones that connect strongly with home, host, and other countries (Luo, 2022; Verbeke, Coeurderoy, & Matt, 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationInternational business in the digital age: Global strategies in a world of national institutions
Meyer, K. E., Li, J., Brouthers, K. D., & Jean, R. “. (2023) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-023-00618-x · Cited by 256 · see citing works
“These dependencies expose them to multiple sources of risk, such as reputational, operational, legal, and digital security risks (Luo, 2022; Nambisan, Zahra, & Luo, 2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialParadigm shift and theoretical implications for the era of global disorder
Luo, Y. (2023) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-023-00659-2 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
“Techno-nationalism, a subset of economic nationalism, is also relevant (Luo, 2022).”
Self-citationThe Tech Cold War, the multipolarization of the world economy, and IB research
Tung, R. L., Zander, I., & Fang, T. (2023) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2023.102195 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Corporate Diplomacy in the Age of U.S.–China Rivalry
Li, J., Shapiro, D., Peng, M. W., & Ufimtseva, A. (2022) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2021.0076 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
The MNE and its subsidiaries at times of global disruptions: An international relations perspective
Meyer, K. E., & Li, C. (2022) · Global Strategy Journal · doi:10.1002/gsj.1436 · Cited by 119 · see citing works
A warning from the Russian–Ukrainian war: avoiding a future that rhymes with the past
Mariotti, S. (2022) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-022-00219-z · Cited by 99 · see citing works
International Business, digital technologies and sustainable development: Connecting the dots
Ciulli, F., & Kolk, A. (2023) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2023.101445 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Exogenous shocks and MNEs: Learning from pandemics, conflicts, and other major disruptions
Ciravegna, L., Ahlström, D., Michailova, S., Oh, C. H., & Gaur, A. S. (2023) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2023.101487 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Coche, E., Kolk, A., & Ocelík, V. (2023) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-023-00172-1 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
“An increase in deglobalization has also been mentioned, as disparate data privacy regulations lead to MNEs and their partners being subject to conflicting market pressures, resulting in fragmentation across regions, countries, and sectors (Nambisan & Luo, 2021).”
InfluentialBeugelsdijk, S. (2022) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-022-00545-3 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
“First, the socioeconomic context in which firms operate changes, often as a result of technological progress (Luo, 2022).”
BackgroundIndustry 5.0 and SDG 9: a symbiotic dance towards sustainable transformation
Costa, E. (2024) · Sustainable Earth Reviews · doi:10.1186/s42055-024-00073-y · Cited by 54 · see citing works
“Commercial tensions and geopo-litical conflicts emerge as potential disruptors, diverting resources from innovation toward military pursuits, posing a risk to global industries [38].”
BackgroundU.S. national security and de-globalization
Godsell, D., Lel, U., & Miller, D. P. (2023) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-023-00621-2 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
“Luo (2021) asserts that techno-nationalism has recently resurged.”
BackgroundInfluentialTechno-nationalism and cross-border acquisitions in an age of geopolitical rivalry
Li, J., Shapiro, D. M., Ufimtseva, A., et al. (2024) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-024-00721-7 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
“…the global institutional environment for firms, especially in high technology sectors, where technology competition and related national security concerns have become a central focus of this rivalry (Buckley, 2022; Capri, 2020; de Graaff et al., 2020; Lai, 2021; Luo, 2022; Tung et al., 2023).”
“Win-lose” globalization and the weaponization of economic policies by nation-states
Mariotti, S. (2024) · Critical Perspectives on International Business · doi:10.1108/cpoib-09-2023-0089 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Media, digital sovereignty and geopolitics: the case of the TikTok ban in India
Kumar, A., & Thussu, D. K. (2023) · Media Culture & Society · doi:10.1177/01634437231174351 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
“Such distinction exemplifies India’s case, which is not based on protectionism conflating digital security with political agendas (Edgerton, 2007; Luo, 2022) but, is a ‘biopolitical’ development which buttresses its digital economy (Prasad, 2022).”
BackgroundThe pursuit of indigenous innovation amid the Tech Cold War: The case of a Chinese high-tech firm
Zhang, L. E., Zhao, S., Kern, P., Edwards, T., & Zhang, Z.-X. (2022) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2022.102079 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Springboard internationalisation in times of geopolitical tensions
Fjellström, D., Bai, W., Oliveira, L., & Fang, T. (2023) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2023.102144 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology
Krammer, S. M. S. (2023) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-023-00173-0 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Corporate social performance in international business
Napier, E., Knight, G., Luo, Y., & Delios, A. (2022) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-022-00584-w · Cited by 40 · see citing works
“Techno-nationalism, for instance, complicates efforts by tech-sector MNEs to conduct globally coordinated CSP activities (Luo, 2022).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe internationalisation of R&D: Past, present and future
Dachs, B., Amoroso, S., Castellani, D., et al. (2023) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2023.102191 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Mariotti, S. (2023) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-023-00263-3 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
“The resurgence of this debate is sparked by the trend of developed economies and their emerging competitors toward a techno-nationalism that combines political, economic, and security considerations that echo the characteristics of global protectionism (Luo, 2022; Mariotti, 2022), namely: (i) globalization is seen not…”
BackgroundMariotti, S. (2024) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-024-00327-y · Cited by 38 · see citing works
“…especially given the technological paradigms dominated by the so-called four S’s (sunk costs, synergies, scalability, and spillovers; see Haskel & Westlake, 2017), which require large-scale public investment and global cooperation that transcend the narrow logic of techno-nationalism (Luo, 2022).”
Soyaltın, D., & Demiryol, T. (2023) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2022.2158080 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
“over the past two decades, a ‘new’ form of techno-nationalism emerged, one that reflects both the decline of globalisation and the return of great power competition (luo 2022).”
BackgroundNavigating industrial policy and global value chains in an era of disruptions
Gereffi, G., Pananond, P., Tell, F., & Fang, T. (2025) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-025-00223-9 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
“…(i.e., the concept and practices of linking technological capabilities directly to a country’s national security and geopolitical advantages) (Luo, 2022), security-driven industrial policy views economic interdependencies as zero-sum competition, in contrast to the positive-sum logic of…”
Cross-border data transfer: patterns and discrepancies
Rong, K., Ling, Y., Yang, T., & Huang, C. (2025) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-025-00209-7 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Shi, J. (2024) · Technovation · doi:10.1016/j.technovation.2024.102998 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Challenging the orthodoxy in international business research: Directions for “new” research areas
Delios, A., Li, J., Schotter, A. P. J., & Vrontis, D. (2024) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2024.101552 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Charpin, R., London, J., & Vincent, N. (2023) · International Journal of Production Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2023.109120 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
The Tech Cold War: What can we learn from the most dynamic patent classes?
Godinho, M. M., & Simões, V. C. (2023) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2023.102140 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Semiconductors at the Intersection of Geoeconomics, Technonationalism, and Global Value Chains
Park, S. A. (2023) · Social Sciences · doi:10.3390/socsci12080466 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
How do multinational enterprises respond to geopolitics? A review and research agenda
Moura, S. T. G., Lawton, T. C., & Tobin, D. (2025) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/ijmr.12399 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Theorizing about emerging multinationals' cross‐border acquisitions
Peng, M. W., Wang, J. C., Xie, E., & Lebedev, S. (2024) · Global Strategy Journal · doi:10.1002/gsj.1512 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Internationalization and innovation: A multilevel meta‐analysis of national sentiments
Wu, S., & Fan, D. (2024) · Journal of Product Innovation Management · doi:10.1111/jpim.12725 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Politically connected EMNCs in a (de)globalising world: A review and future research directions
Huang, D., Tsui-Auch, L. S., Dieleman, M., & Gomulya, D. (2023) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2023.102196 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Parente, R., Rong, K., Shi, X., Kang, Z., & Zhou, D. (2024) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2024.102455 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Wang, S. L. (2023) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-022-00249-7 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
“The situation becomes more complex in the context of rising geopolitical tensions and tech-nationalism (Luo, 2022), which complicates the rational calculations of reputation benefits and risks associated with control and coordination in the GVCs.”
BackgroundInternational High‐Tech SMEs Amid Geopolitical Pressures
Sinani, E., & Zilja, F. (2024) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12875 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
China’s Digital Silk Road in the Age of the Digital Economy: Political Analysis
Cheng, G. (2022) · Vestnik RUDN International Relations · doi:10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-2-271-287 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Yan, S., Zou, L., Growe, A., & Wang, Q. (2024) · Cities · doi:10.1016/j.cities.2024.105322 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
China as a Threat and Balancing Behavior in the Realm of Emerging Technologies
Papageorgiou, M. M., Can, M., & Vieira, A. V. G. (2024) · Chinese Political Science Review · doi:10.1007/s41111-024-00248-0 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Navigating geopolitical risks: How U.S. firms adjust supply chains amid U.S.–China rivalry
Yang, B., Song, J., Wei, Y., & Li, J. (2025) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-025-00800-3 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Kuai, J. (2025) · Digital Journalism · doi:10.1080/21670811.2025.2502851 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“In addition, Chinese journalists’ algorithmic imaginaries (Bucher 2017) are informed by broader, nationally held sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2009), which carry elements of techno-nationalism (Luo 2022).”
Li, J., Shapiro, D., & Ufimtseva, A. (2024) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-023-00177-w · Cited by 17 · see citing works
The European Union in the age of slowbalisation
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Zhu, Y., Zhu, Z., Xu, W., & Zhu, Y. (2025) · Frontiers in Education · doi:10.3389/feduc.2025.1656518 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
“Traditional models of higher education internationalization–based on physical mobility and fixed curriculum systems–are undergoing disruptive reconstruction (Luo, 2022; Luo and Van Assche, 2023).”
Vrontis, D., Shams, S. M. R., Thrassou, A., & Kafouros, M. I. (2024) · Journal of International Management · doi:10.1016/j.intman.2024.101188 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Ren, M., & Gao, H. (2023) · Journal of International Management · doi:10.1016/j.intman.2023.101069 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Park, S. A. (2023) · Asia and the Global Economy · doi:10.1016/j.aglobe.2023.100063 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Connecting the Computer Skills with General Performance of Companies—An Eastern European Study
Stoenoiu, C. E., & Jäntschi, L. (2024) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su162210024 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Pillich, S. M. (2024) · Management Review Quarterly · doi:10.1007/s11301-024-00414-3 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Towards Technological Sovereignty: Theoretical Approaches, Practice, Suggestions
Faykov, D. Y., & Baydarov, D. Y. (2023) · Economic Revival of Russia · doi:10.37930/1990-9780-2023-1-75-67-82 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Schmeisser, B., Saebi, T., Schotter, A. P. J., & Gooderham, P. (2025) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2025.101695 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
The evolution of stigmas facing Chinese MNEs abroad: From latecomer stigma to geopolitical stigma
Zhou, F., Prud'homme, D. G., & Liu, H. (2025) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2025.102456 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
More jobs for our foes? Global R&D strategy in the age of techno-nationalism
Yoon, H. D., Sinani, E., Papanastassiou, M., & Economou, I. G. (2025) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2025.105196 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Yue, L. Q., Zheng, J., Mao, K., & Yang, T. (2024) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063241289884 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Digital geopolitics in a VUCA world: China encounters a new global order
Liu, H., & Miao, C. (2024) · Global Policy · doi:10.1111/1758-5899.13435 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
National security review and ownership participation in cross-border acquisitions
Jiang, J., & Zhang, J. (2024) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2024.102329 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Geopolitical risk and international business: a multi-disciplinary review and research agenda
Patsiaouras, G., Saren, M., & Green, P. (2026) · Multinational Business Review · doi:10.1108/mbr-06-2025-0204 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Geopolitical tensions: risks and challenges for internationally scaling businesses
Bretas, V. P. G., & Tippmann, E. (2025) · Multinational Business Review · doi:10.1108/mbr-07-2025-0244 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Tsou, C.-T., & Kim, D.-H. (2024) · Science and Public Policy · doi:10.1093/scipol/scae063 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Dachs, B., Stehrer, R., & Wolfmayr, A. (2025) · Journal of Industrial and Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s40812-025-00362-3 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“The realist narrative, by contrast, points out that technology is a source of national superiority, and the gains of one country inevitably lead to losses for another– a view that has been labelled ‘techno-nationalism’ (Hitt et al., 2021; Luo, 2022).”
Firewalls or frontlines: Geopolitical tensions and multinationals' digital technology upgrading
Fan, D., Ding, J., Wu, S., & Su, Y. (2025) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2025.124147 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Caught in the crossfire: Multinational enterprises in the era of geopolitical tensions
Sinani, E., Hobdari, B., Brandl, K., & Gammelgaard, J. (2026) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2026.102590 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Techno-nationalism and capability development in the global pharmaceuticals industry, 1918–1970
Godley, A., Buckley, T., & Joseph, M. (2025) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-025-00210-0 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“Critical features of “new” techno nationalism identified by Luo (2022) include: decoupling, strategically significant technological capabilities, and the existence of a perceived threat to national interests.”
InfluentialTechno-nationalism to collaborative technology sovereignty
Lee, J., Kim, H., Si, S., et al. (2024) · Science and Public Policy · doi:10.1093/scipol/scae046 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Prud'homme, D. G., Han, N., McCourt, D. M., et al. (2025) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2025.101648 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Hou, R., & Rui, H. (2024) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2024.101596 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Tang, R. W., Rammal, H. G., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2024) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2024.10.008 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Foreign policy: implications for multinational firms
Andrews, D. S., Fainshmidt, S., Witt, M. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2024) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-024-00200-8 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“These conflicts and others are due to volatile individual, societal, and international systems influencing a nation’s strategy toward engagement with another nation (e.g., Czinkota & Steen, 2010; Luo, 2022).”
Yang, M., & Ai, Q. (2023) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-023-09923-3 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Yet, little is known about whether these findings are applicable in the high-tech industry, which has unique features that link its development to a country’s economic growth, prosperity and national security (Luo, 2022 ).”
Tzeng, C.-H. (2022) · Multinational Business Review · doi:10.1108/mbr-05-2021-0059 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Sinani, E., Dachs, B., Hobdari, B., & Papanastassiou, M. (2024) · R and D Management · doi:10.1111/radm.12728 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Subsidiary strategy in the modern multinational: Grappling with change and complexity
Andersson, U. R., Ryan, P. A., Giblin, M., & Gillmore, E. (2025) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2025.102536 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Yue, L. Q., & Takeda, Y. (2025) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2025.100219 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Fewer, T. J., Ma, D., & Coraiola, D. M. (2025) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2021.15574 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Historical political animosity prevents the fluid exchange of information about technical and scientific approaches between nations and limits prior interactions between organizations, resulting in the production of divergent technological approaches (Luo 2022).”
InfluentialBrada, J. C., & Park, J. (2024) · Asia and the Global Economy · doi:10.1016/j.aglobe.2024.100097 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Ren, X. Y. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009464864 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
A WARNING FROM THE RUSSIAN–UKRAINIAN WAR: AVOIDING A FUTURE THAT RHYMES WITH THE PAST
Mariotti, S. (2022) · Ekonomìka ì prognozuvannâ · doi:10.15407/eip2022.03.007 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Vanino, E., Douch, M., & Çakmak, İ. (2026) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2026.105471 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Bednarski, L., Subramanian, N., Roscoe, S., et al. (2026) · International Journal of Operations & Production Management · doi:10.1108/ijopm-01-2025-0040 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Canada’s Leap Forward in Research Security
Sá, C. M., Pashayeva, A., & Weidenslaufer, C. (2025) · Minerva · doi:10.1007/s11024-025-09591-1 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
China’s semiconductor conundrum: understanding US export controls and their efficacy
Shrivastava, M., & Jash, A. (2025) · Cogent Social Sciences · doi:10.1080/23311886.2025.2528450 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
When Great Powers Struggle: How Geopolitical Alignments of Small States Are Influenced by Their MNEs
Matala, S., & Stutz, C. (2025) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.13254 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Technology-seeking FDI policy change and local firm innovation
Wang, P., Deng, Z., Wu, Z., & Kumar, V. (2025) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2025.102411 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The effects of host and home country economies on MNEs’ overseas CSR investment
Zhou, Y., Liu, P., & Teng, M. (2024) · Journal of International Management · doi:10.1016/j.intman.2024.101191 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Gurkov, I. B., & Dahms, S. (2023) · International journal of organizational analysis · doi:10.1108/ijoa-03-2023-3658 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Романова, О. А., & Ponomareva, A. O. (2023) · Regional Economics Theory and Practice · doi:10.24891/re.21.4.604 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Deglobalization processes in the global economy and prospects for its innovative development
Matkovskaya, Y. (2023) · Economic Analysis Theory and Practice · doi:10.24891/ea.22.1.4 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Tecno-nacionalismo y nacionalismo digital en la cuarta revolución industrial
Gayozzo, P. (2022) · Teknokultura Revista de Cultura Digital y Movimientos Sociales · doi:10.5209/tekn.80449 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Techno-nationalism in Global Value Chains in the Technology Sector
Cieślik, E., & Zamojska, A. (2025) · European Review · doi:10.1017/s1062798725100318 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“This reflects a low level of techno-nationalism and the lack of widespread decoupling from China, not only in the EU, but also in the US (Luo 2021).”
The future of global virtual work: Toward an interdisciplinary and integrative research agenda
Blay, T., Schöbel, S., Heubeck, T., Reinwald, M., Lanzl, J., Froese, F. J., Tenzer, H., Presbitero, A., Stein, M., Taras, V., et al. (2026) · German Journal of Human Resource Management Zeitschrift für Personalforschung · doi:10.1177/23970022261436919 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
The link between China's catchup process and the China-US technology decoupling
Xie, Z., Zhao, Y., Li, P. P., & Wu, R. J. (2025) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2025.124235 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Building resilience amidst geopolitical tensions: The case of U.S. MNE subsidiaries in China
Yu, J. S., Fang, Y., Bai, Y., & Chen, F. (2025) · Journal of International Management · doi:10.1016/j.intman.2025.101260 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Singh, N., Jash, A., & Nanjappa, Y. (2025) · Cogent Social Sciences · doi:10.1080/23311886.2025.2499171 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
R&D Management Under Disruption and Uncertainty
Li, D., Fu, X., Narula, R., von Zedtwitz, M., & Wagner, B. (2025) · R and D Management · doi:10.1111/radm.12747 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“In the same vein, institutional disruption also tends to induce technological disruption and reshape firms' R&D activities, as shown in the rising techno-nationalism literature (e.g., Luo 2022) and in the articles of this special issue (Fu et al. 2025; Sinani et al. 2025).”
Developing critical geopolitical awareness in management education
Belhoste, N., & Dimitrova, A. (2023) · Management Learning · doi:10.1177/13505076231185970 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Rather than focusing solely on states and power relations, a critical perspective of geopolitics studies the interactions over time and space between both state and non-state actors, including MNCs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a variety of social movements and protest groups (Flint, 2012).”
InfluentialTechno-nationalism and innovative development of the contemporary economy
Matkovskaya, Y. S. (2022) · Drukerovskij vestnik · doi:10.17213/2312-6469-2022-4-49-64 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Zheng, W.-W., Wu, L., & Zhong, X. (2025) · Industry and Innovation · doi:10.1080/13662716.2025.2569035 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
- Authors
- Luo, Y.
- Affiliations
- University of Miami (US)
- Corresponding author
- Luo, Yadong
- ORCID
- Luo, Yadong
- Venue
- Journal of International Business Studies
- Published
- 2021-09-07
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 550-567
- ISSN
- 0047-2506 (ISSN-L)
- 1478-6990
- PMC
- PMC8421717
- OpenAlex
- W3198785715
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 72 · 2025: 81 · 2024: 53 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 17
- FWCI
- 23.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of International Business Studies (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › International Business and FDI
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › COVID-19, Geopolitics, Technology, Migration
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Business Strategy and Innovation
- Keywords
- techno-nationalism, multinational corporations, international business risk, geopolitical risk, economic coercion, technology supply chains, open innovation, coopetition, national security, risk management, zero-sum competition
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