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Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating
Open accessAbstract
The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner’s dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [25]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, J., Suri, S., & Watts, D. J.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Microsoft Research New York City (United States) (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2012-08-17
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 36
- Pages
- 14363-14368
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC3437882
- OpenAlex
- W2081896594
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 63.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- cooperation, assortativity, iterated prisoner's dilemma, link deletion, conditional cooperation, social punishment, human subjects research, update frequency
- MeSH terms
- Choice Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Reward
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