Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: Why do humans cooperate in one-time interactions with strangers? The most prominent explanations for this long-standing puzzle rely on punishment of noncooperators, but differ in the form punishment takes. In models of direct punishment, noncooperators are punished directly at personal cost, whereas indirect reciprocity assumes that punishment is indirect by withholding rewards. To resolve the persistent debate on which model better explains cooperation, we conduct the first field experiment, to our knowledge, on direct and indirect punishment among strangers in real-life interactions. We show that many people punish noncooperators directly but prefer punishing indirectly by withholding help when possible. The occurrence of direct and indirect punishment in the field shows that both are key to understanding the evolution of human cooperation.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Balafoutas, L., Nikiforakis, N., & Rockenbach, B.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2014-10-27
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 45
- Pages
- 15924-15927
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2005268460
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 37.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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