THE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Due to diverging levels of political influence of various income groups, political institutions likely reflect the policy preferences of certain groups of citizens better than others, independently of their numerical weight. This runs counter the egalitarian principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’. The present article documents a general trend of underrepresentation of the preferences of relatively poor citizens both by parties and by governments across Western democracies, although important cross-national differences exist.
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Citations
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Cited by
Can Deliberative Participatory Fora Cure Representation Gaps in France and Germany?
Blome, A., & Hartlapp, M. (2023) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-022-00452-0 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Giger, N., Rosset, J., & Bernauer, J.
- Venue
- Representation
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 47-61
- ISSN
- 0034-4893 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-4001
- OpenAlex
- W1969380158
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 28.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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