The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument
Open accessAbstract
The word ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I am going to discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art:intransitive self-consciousness.As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00355521 · Cited by 1,019
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness
Neander, K. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18 · Cited by 124
Cited by
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2007) · doi:10.4324/9780203086599 · Cited by 1,512
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience
Thompson, E. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x · Cited by 322
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
Weisberg, J. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3 · Cited by 83
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
Metadata
- Authors
- Kriegel, U.
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-03
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103-132
- ISSN
- 0045-5091 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-0820
- OpenAlex
- W1908673271
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 9.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716537
- The paper
- Kriegel, U. (2003). Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716537
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.